Archived Newsletters

Research versus Teaching

Letters being scarce this issue, there is space available for the new editor of Physics and Society to reflect upon themes which he drew from two conferences he has attended this summer, both strongly related to our Forum's core of "physics and society". The first was the Ethical Issues in Physics Workshop at Eastern Michigan University, July 19-20. The second event was the International Conference on Undergraduate Education at University of Maryland (UMD), July 30-August 3. Sponsored by a major research university and the research "establishment" (APS) as well as by the teaching "establishment" (AAPT), and attended accordingly, the second conference focused upon the need and the methods for improving undergraduate education.

Most of the Workshop participants explicitly, and many of the Conference attendees implicitly, recognized the ethical dilemma of taking money for teaching while concentrating upon our research desires. They are beginning to see that the American public is not convinced that we physics faculty - especially those at the research universities - are at all interested in undergraduate education, especially for future citizen non-scientists. We all are beginning to understand that the taxpayer will soon tire of funding educational institutions which fail to educate well. For example, the numerous current attacks on academic tenure are one manifestation of this growing discontent. There is an implicit understanding, both among ourselves and in the general public, that there may be a contradiction between research and effective teaching. This potential contradiction was made explicit at the ethics workshop: there is an ethical problem in securing funds for one task and using them for other activities. We all recognize that both teaching and research are important: you can't succeed at one while completely ignoring the other; besides, neither the public nor our profession will allow us to do so. However, time, energy, resources, and awards are in short supply at any institution; in the competition for them between research and teaching, teaching often receives short shrift.

It is clear that some of the institutions firmly ensconced at the pinnacle of the research world (e.g., UMD) place major resources at the disposal of their teaching endeavors; the results often show it. For example, UMD has state-of-the-art lecture halls and demonstration facilities, spends considerable effort at exploring modern alternatives/complements to lecturing, and extends its superb physics demonstration program out into the community state-wide. How can this commitment and effective teaching endeavor be extended to the larger numbers of universities now climbing the research hierarchy? This is where most of our undergraduate future citizens "live", in institutions chasing the ghost of research prestige and dollars while often ignoring the realities of student and societal needs and discontents.

At a time of shrinking budgets and increasing call upon them, it is appropriate to ask whether we should be making it harder or easier for the newer research universities to get research grants. Should we couple the granting of research grants with evidence of teaching performance (or, more importantly, student learning)? In hiring and rewarding young faculty, should more coupling be demanded between research activity and teaching/learning performance? If such couplings are desirable, how are we to dispassionately evaluate the latter so as to continue and extend our scientific tradition of making grants based upon excellence rather than "pull"? I have no immediate answers but know that conditions will no longer allow us the luxury of avoiding the questions. I welcome comments and an exchange of views on this subject from our readers.

Al Saperstein

A Murderous Relation Between Fellow Professionals?

In response to the tragic murder of three engineering professors by a graduate student at San Diego State University, the editor of this newsletter invites public comment on the professional and power relationships that may have contributed to this shattering event. Aspects of this case that are potential subjects for comment include, but are not limited to:

  • Power relationships between professors and graduate students
  • Power relationships between professors and post docs
  • New paradigms for professor/assistant relations
  • Effects of such violence on public perception of scientists
  • Relationship to ethics statements by scientific societies

We enthusiastically solicit your comments on this event and other similar violent events which have struck our profession in recent years. In the interests of completeness and openness, we will respect requests for anonymity.

Jeffrey J Marque

Science, Politics, and Human Rights

APS Nicholson Medal Talk, 3 May 1996

I would like to talk about some problems of defending human rights and, in particular, the human rights of scientists living in totalitarian regimes like the former Soviet Union and China today.

The main problem seems to be stability. Opponents of strong human rights pressure on China insist that such pressure can dangerously destabilize the country given its huge, multiethnic and comparatively poor population. "Look at Russia," they sometimes argue. My answer is: "Yes, look at Russia!"

The return to a new type of totalitarian regime that may be less predictable than the previous ones is certainly possible in this country because many people who thought democracy would provide a quick fix for all their problems are now disaffected with it. This is to be expected in any transition from totalitarianism to democracy. Even so, a large scale civil war is unlikely -- Chechnya is a tragic exception -- and the texture of political democracy in everyday Russia hasn't been particularly unstable. The pace of political democratization after Gorbachev and his reforms has been more or less normal. There have been some big bumps, of course, like the 1993 bloody conflict between the President and Parliament, when the Russian communists and fascists -- in a radical attempt to stop reforms -- defended the "White House," and Yeltsin bombed it. However, a feedback system existed in this huge undeveloped democracy, and after the 1993 conflict both sides became much more careful. Basically, the country has been, and remains, calm

. The major sources of instability in Russian democracy today are not fundamentally political, but economic and legal. The situation would have been better had we democratic dissidents prepared economic ideas along with our political ones, but we were rather busy with human and civil rights. When the economic changes from the top came in '92, they came as a kind of revolution -- abrupt and inconsistent, without a prepared basis in law and law enforcement. The scale of crime and corruption in Russia today is the result of the revolutionary economic freedom, not political freedom. No one predicted these crimes or how quickly people could and would exploit the new economic situation. Perhaps they could have done so, perhaps not. China seems to be avoiding this problem: the economic part of the liberation there is already well under way and well under control. Of course, that control is partly possible because of a lack of political freedom. The legal swamp in Russia -- many laws in conflict, many needed laws absent -- does represent a failure of the democrats and intelligentsia. It's hard to imagine how to create a real legal system and body of decent laws overnight, especially in a country with so little experience of them. This would be a problem facing any country shedding its totalitarian past, but certainly more progress should have been made in the last eight years. A serious area of potential instability in the Russian Federation (and in China, too, perhaps) is multiethnicity. With the tragic exception of the war in Chechnya, which was begun by the Russian government itself, not by the people, there are no armed conflicts between minorities and Russians. Why? Precisely because the idea of solving the problem of national minorities in a maximally democratic way -- giving them the full set of cultural, economic and administrative freedoms -- was conceptually prepared by the democratic dissidents, in particular by Sakharov, and has been implemented by President Yeltsin personally (Unfortunately, Yeltsin is also personally responsible for the war in Chechnya, which is a colonial war that is being conducted in a way that is a war crime.)

This conceptual preparation -- democratic dissidents educating the intelligentsia in non-violent opposition to a violent regime -- went on for a quarter of a century. We tried to change the mentality of the intelligentsia and (less effectively) that of ordinary people, as well as new generations of bureaucrats, and in this we succeeded. Today there are several generations of intelligentsia in Russia and even high bureaucrats who have been educated in this approach, as well as most of the latest generation of journalists, who help to shape public opinion. The situation is very different in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucuses, and Central Asia, where anti-violent opposition to the communist regimes either has never existed or has been underdeveloped. As a result, mutual solutions of interethnic conflicts are hard and violent in these areas. This is strong evidence that long-time preparation of public psychology by an anti-violence democratic opposition is a crucial factor in avoiding civil war.

For such preparation to work, this opposition needs very strong support from around the world. The fact that we Russian dissidents had our partial success, and survived to see it, is partly due to the strong and steady support we received in the West -- in my case and Sakharov's, support especially from fellow scientists. It is extremely important to continue defense of scientists like us around the world.

The crucial issue, I think, is: What is really more dangerous for domestic and international peace and security -- a repressive totalitarian regime that may gradually improve itself without pressure, or an unstable democracy? I think choosing the former is wrong for the following reasons. First let me say that a totalitarian regime like China is a special case. You have the usual repressive regime with almost unlimited political power, a state ideology and restrictions on other ideologies, and a degree of xenophobia and conspiratorial secrecy combined with aggressiveness. In addition, however, you also have the dream of being a nuclear superpower. One more superpower is perhaps not a catastrophic problem if it is a strongly democratic one. From the point of view of international peace and security, it is extremely important that China become democratic before it achieves the status of a superpower. From the point of view of peace inside China, a democratic approach to social, national and religious problems can help avoid violent revolutionary explosions. All this means that scientists concerned with democracy and world peace urgently need to keep up the pressure for human rights in China, and help that small number of our extremely brave Chinese colleagues who oppose totalitarianism and push their leaders peacefully in the direction of democratic political reforms.

But what if such pressure helps give birth to an unstable democracy in China? Unfortunately, there seems to be no formula for making a transition from a totalitarian regime to a safe democracy. This is an area that urgently needs study and work. It is true that unstable democracies -- and even stable ones -- have terrorism and thefts of nuclear and other dangerous materials that you don't find in a totalitarian regime. It is obvious that disappearing plutonium and even tragedies like terrorist massacres are far less dangerous than having yet another confrontation with a totalitarian superpower. When faced with a totalitarian superpower, there is almost nothing to do but arm yourself as much as possible while trying to engage in negotiations to scale things down. What about a totalitarian regime improving on its own? The very notion of a totalitarian regime gradually improving itself, without permanent and hard pressure, can be a fantasy. (Recall that the Soviet regime was pressed -- very, very hard.) There is some threshold beyond which a totalitarian regime is too totalitarian to be amenable to improvements. It will suppress them unless pressured, and apparently in the case of China, often suppress them if not pressured hard enough. Granted that human rights in China is our affair, if only because an undemocratic China is a threat to international peace and security. We may still be uneasy about actively supporting Chinese scientific colleagues who are trying to protest against political repression, on the grounds they are only a tiny part of the scientific community there. Some scientists insist that they are a small minority not because the majority is afraid, but simply because it supports government policy. Even If this is true, it still does not mean that the majority is right. Moreover, to judge from my personal experience, determining who is or is not really opposed to their totalitarian government is a rather more complicated phenomenon than it appears.

For scientists in a totalitarian society, the line between the professional and the political collapses because neutrality is not tolerated by the regime. Scientists have only two choices: cooperation (some might say, complicity) with the regime, or resistance to it. Remember, your salary comes from the regime. Your promotions, opportunities for publication, and travel abroad depend on political evaluations. Your outstanding work supports the regime by adding to its international prestige and, in the case of technological and military work, its economic and military power. A line cannot be drawn between the cooperation and non-cooperation of an active, working scientist. It can only be drawn between degrees of cooperation.

How did scientists in the Soviet Union confront this dilemma? How did they respond to colleagues who resisted the regime by struggling for democracy and human rights? During the period that I personally experienced (1956 onwards), their responses were radically diverse. As some of you may know, in April 1956 -- exactly 40 years ago -- immediately after the famous Khrushchev "secret" speech, I declared at an open Party meeting in ITEP that we needed democratization on the basis of socialism. Along with three other speakers, I was immediately expelled from the Party and fired from ITEP, without the right to work in any scientific institute in or near Moscow. The decision was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and confirmed by the Politburo, a body high enough to have scared anyone only three years previously, In Stalin's time.

In 1956, encouraged by Khrushchev's anti-Stalin's speech, scientists from the main physics Institutes -- Lebedev, ITEP (Moscow), Budker (Novosibirsk), Ioffe (Leningrad), and IPT (Kharkov) -- sent us, their unemployed colleagues, financial support, though secretly, of course. At that time, some 20-30 leading physics, including Kapitsa, Sakharov, and Alikhanov, were very active in writing collective letters (not for publication, of course) to the leaders protesting attempts to restore or protect Stalinism. The majority of scientists, however, were afraid to participate in such activity.

The behavior of even the majority of that leading minority changed rather quickly after Khrushchev's fall in the 1960s. Like most of the intelligentsia, they became rather depressed or cowed, and most were disinclined to continue their protests. In the mid-60s, only Mikhail Leontovich, Kapitsa and a handful of much less famous scientists risked signing protest letters written by dissidents, who were mostly intellectuals demanding glasnost, among other things. Human rights activists and other dissidents had emerged in the USSR, some opposing the regime on purely moral grounds like Sakharov and others opposing it on political grounds as well (like myself).

Very soon the society as a whole as well as the scientific community became sharply divided into people in open opposition, always some half-hundred still-not-arrested people (among them Andrei Sakharov), and others. (The Jewish refuseniks, many of them scientists, appeared later.) Under totalitarian conditions, there was a big ditch between these two groups, and a striking difference in behavior. That ditch was dug not simply by the repressive conditions, not simply by the powerful Party-KGB propaganda machine of disinformation, but by intellectuals as well. In about 1970, I told a friend who was a famous physicist that I was preparing a letter to the Soviet authorities about the situation in Soviet science. "But," he asked,"Do you want to continue to work as a physicist?" There was nothing wrong with this concern and indirect advice. What amazed me, however, was that after this conversation he always avoided me and at one scientific meeting bypassed me as if I were a pole on a complex plane.

The majority of scientists maintained an ambiguous or hypocritical public silence. Some did criticize the regime, but only in the privacy of the famous Moscow kitchens. Only a small (but significant) minority expressed strong professional and public support of the regime, and lack of support for colleagues opposed to the regime. This lack of support ranged from expressions of dislike to outright condemnation. A tiny minority chose ideological confrontation with the regime, which cost them their scientific careers and in some cases incarceration in prisons, camps, and exile.

In time, this picture changed. Nowadays, truly amazing numbers of Russians, scientists included, present themselves as having been longtime dissidents and democrats (but then, Russia is the land of revisionist history). Still, it is true that from the middle '60s when Brezhnev came to power to Gorbachev's time there were more and more free kitchen discussions, more people listening to foreign radio broadcasts, more samizdat readings, fewer and fewer citations of Lenin and Marx even by Party-member intellectuals, and more and more non-dissident "outsiders" -- including scientists -- secretly helping their oppressed colleagues by giving money and clothes, sending letters to camp, and helping to transmit our human rights information. Let me return now to the matter of our colleagues in China. What should we do apart from active support of persecuted fellow scientists? In answering this question, we need to face the issue of collaborating with the fellow scientists who are officially acceptable to the regime. Their cooperation with the regime is, as I suggested in connection with Russia, a matter of degree, so it is desirable to examine each case, putting our emphasis on science but not closing our eyes to the obvious. Here it may be argued that any and all contacts with our Chinese colleagues are necessary to "keep lines of communication open" In order to have some beneficial effect on the regime. So let me ask: what lines of communication are involved? Certainly not ones of genuine, serious political discourse. Remember that during the 1930s Stalin had several thousand Americans and Germans working in Russia, and it didn't make a bit of difference.

I would also like to suggest that it is one thing to invite Chinese scientists to the West, say, to a conference at one's university, and quite another to go to a conference in China. For we organize independent, scientific conferences. They organize official conferences that are always mixtures of science and state politics. Western scientists who think that scientists should not be involved in politics should bear this in mind: attending a scientific conference in China is participating in a political situation. My view is that attending such conferences is constructive if, when in China, one publicly speaks out in defense of scientific colleagues being punished for their political views. Keeping silent in such circumstances is not only not constructive; It helps the regime by legitimizing the persecution of colleagues. In short, just as scientists in a totalitarian society cannot separate the professional and the political, neither can visiting western colleagues going to China or any other totalitarian state. This is one of the many reasons why totalitarianism is an affront to us as scientists and as human beings. It is one of the reasons why we should, as scientists and human beings, do our best to oppose it.

Yuri F. Orlov
Newman Laboratory, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

A Coverup of Nuclear Test Information?

Circumstantial evidence suggests government deception regarding withheld data on a 1962 US nuclear explosive test. The results have had and continue to have arms control, nuclear demilitarization, nonproliferation, and nuclear-fuel management implications affecting both civilian and military nuclear policy. An item-by-item consideration suggests that the withheld data is more likely to reinforce than to weaken impressions about inherent resistance of reactor grade plutonium to proliferation susceptibility.

The 1962 detonation involved plutonium of a quality below that of weapons grade. To reinforce its 1967 announcements that "high-irradiation level reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons," the US government added in 1977 that "a nuclear test was conducted using reactor grade plutonium" and "it successfully produced a nuclear yield." As a result of the Openness Initiative formulated by Secretary O'Leary, DOE announced in 1994 that the plutonium was "provided" by the UK and the upper limit of explosive yield was 20 kt. [1,2] Compared to data released about other nuclear detonations, the information disclosed about the 1962 test has little substance. Here are some examples of additional information that would not divulge sensitive technical details or jeopardize national security or nonproliferation goals:

  1. Did the 1962 test use an existing stockpile warhead, with the plutonium core (pit) fully replaced or was the pit of larger dimension, possibly with other modifications, to account for reduced fissile density?
  2. Was the plutonium consistent with current high-burnup reactor-grade (see diagram below), or was it closer to weapons grade?
  3. Was the material converted to oxide or a low-density metallic phase, or was it in the same chemical and high density metallic form as normal weapon pits?
  4. Did the explosion come close to the 20-kt upper limit (which corresponds to that expected for a device containing weapons-grade plutonium) or was the yield consistent with lower average output, compatible with statistical expectations from diminished fissile quality?
100% Pu-239 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
Weapons Grade Fuel Grade Reactor Grade
UK 1953 tests US 1962 Test

In fact, the missing data are likely to be quite discouraging to potential proliferators, thus fortifying existing perceptions about inherent difficulties in weaponization of civilian plutonium.

Technical Inconsistencies in Declassified Data

In addition to the previously described omissions of substance, inferences that one can draw from the declassified information are inconsistent with deducible scientific principles and other published data.

Emerging public evidence suggests that the fissile (Pu-239) quality of plutonium in the test might have been persistently understated. Fresh disclosures from London indicate that the plutonium could not have been what we now consider to be reactor-grade[3]. DOE now implies, but doesn't assert, that the plutonium was fuel grade.

Meanwhile, other nations have publicized their disagreement with the DOE "spin" on declassified test information. In fact, the French "scorned the US government affirmation that it successfully exploded a weapon made with 'reactor-grade' plutonium."[4] During the 1950s the British carried out two tests with sub-grade plutonium that they considered disappointing. Based on these results, they went on to make weapons only from high- grade materials. Although the results of the tests were reported in an official UK book, the information is considered classified in the US. This British data is not consistent with the 1962 test conclusions reported to the American public.

Inferences Not Resolved by the Declassified Information

Four possible inferences come to mind that could be deduced from shortfalls in the declassified information:

  1. The material supplied for the weapon might not have been reactor grade, but might have been fuel grade or better. This explanation has recently been prominent, with various quasi-official acknowledgments that it might really have been fuel grade. Redefinitions of plutonium grade by DOE allude to such an explanation. However, it should be noted that those redefinitions only apply to terminology used by DOE classification officials; it had been commonly understood in the nuclear industry that "reactor grade" implied high burnup with a fissile plutonium fraction well under 80% and usually less than 70%.[5]

    Some clues about the quality of plutonium used in the US test can be derived from the published UK "Totem" 1953 experiments in Australia, which were designed to evaluate the yield reduction resulting from plutonium of less than weapons grade. The plutonium available would have probably been close to the high end (93% fissile) of fuel-grade. Although the Totem explosive yield was highly destructive, they evidently confirmed that it was not good enough for military-quality weapons. Because these results would have been shared with the US, we can guess that the Nevada test might have been conducted with plutonium closer to the low end (81%) of the definition. Thus, a reasonable programmatic justification for the test in 1962 could have been to evaluate the effect of newer data, computations, and designs when used with such plutonium.

  2. The material might not have been produced in the UK, but was created from irradiation in a nuclear reactor of some other nation. The released statement about the source of plutonium does not actually preclude this possibility. It simply says the plutonium was "provided" by the UK. My dictionary clearly distinguishes between material provided ("to give what is wanted or needed") from produced ("to bring into existence...by machine"). Examples of another sources would be the Canadian NRX and NRU reactors. If the plutonium originated outside the UK, it would contravene published assertions and possibly violate some publicly acknowledged governmental agreements or treaties.[6]

  3. The materials might have been produced in a US civilian reactor, rather than a foreign military or dual-purpose reactor. Although the DOE press statement points toward the UK, it might have been produced in the United States. Such a ruse could have been accomplished by actual or virtual transfer of materials from the US to the UK. Large quantities of fissile materials were exchanged between the two countries under the Mutual Defense Agreement. Could some or all of the plutonium for the 1962 test have been diverted from a US reactor? If so, this might have been something to hide, although not prohibited by legislation until 1983. [7].

  4. The explosive yield and the success of the test might have been grossly overstated. What if the yield were an order of magnitude less? If the yield were significantly less than 20 kt, considerable skepticism would have arisen about the published conclusions and the "successful" label attached to the test. The DOE statements about the need to bootstrap predictive capabilities with the results of the test tend to reinforce this possible explanation. Why was it necessary to invoke "extensive nuclear test data base and predictive capabilities" to reinforce the assertion that "weapons can be constructed with reactor-grade plutonium"? Was it not possible for the 1962 test to stand on its own, without being propped up by other undisclosed data? All of this implies that the so-called "successful" results of the test were not as good as claimed and would not be convincing.

Releasability of the Missing Data
By DOE's own declassification criteria and practices, additional data should have been disclosed long ago.[8] Among the general criteria are "benefit to be realized" from declassification, extent to which information would "assist in development of a nuclear weapon capability," and impact of continued classification on the "credibility of the DOE classification program." The criteria reaffirm that "detailed information" is of "vital importance to the common defense and security," while acknowledging that "general nuclear weapons related information has been declassified" where there is no "undue risk."

Let us consider, in the context of DOE criteria and practices, each the four 1962-test-related topics identified above for which I believe insufficient declassification has taken place:

Technology of Warhead. Whether the explosive device was a warhead taken out of the available stockpile or a special device was used for the 1962 test would not be information that would assist a proliferator. On the contrary, more specific data about the weapons configuration would add to the public sense of confidence associated with technological barriers to military quality weapons. DOE information already declassified includes "External observable features of stockpile weapons systems such as overall dimensions and approximate weight," stating more specifically that some fission weapons have "diameters down to 6 inches and masses down to 50 lbs." They further state that "4 kg of Pu [might be] enough for a nuclear explosive device." Therefore, releasing a general description of the technology used in the 1962 test could hardly be more sensitive than information already disclosed.

Plutonium Quality. If the tested plutonium was more fissile than current high burnup reactor grade, the results signify that even greater difficulties should be experienced by would-be proliferators trying to use lower grade plutonium in weapons. Disclosing more specifics about the fissile content would not aid any weapons design; after all, the plutonium grade used in stockpile weapons is already declassified to be greater than 93% fissile.

Metallurgical Chemical Form. It is already known that higher-density alpha-phase plutonium was used in the first two implosion assemblies. (The 23% higher density is theoretically significant in terms of explosive potential.) If the material in the explosive device were low density metal or oxide, this would imply further technology barriers to weaponization of reactor grade plutonium.[5] Hence, clarification might reinforce the nonproliferation norm.

Explosive Yield. A 10-kt nominal explosive yield from the 1962 test would be consistent with independently derived statistical expectations.[9] A lower yield would be suggestive of greater resistance to proliferant use. No nation with other options would choose such material as the basis for a nuclear-weapons program, and none are known to have done so. Since lower yields would further deter proliferation, release of such information could hardly be considered as damaging to national security. Specific test yields have been announced for many nuclear detonations, e.g., three Rio-Blanco tests at 33 kt each, Flask-Green at 105 kt, and five Buggy tests at 1.08 kt. So why isn't the yield of the 1962 detonation more specifically declassified, especially when any value under the announced 20-kt maximum would reinforce nonproliferation safeguards? Table 1 compares declassified information released for experiments that bracket the average expected yield using reactor-grade plutonium.

Table 1: Comparison of Declassified DOE Nuclear-Explosive Test Information(*)

Information Category Declassified Test Example 1 Reactor Grade Plutonium Text Declassified Test Example 2
Test Series Operation Crosstie Operation Nougat
Test Name Buggy Aardvark
Test Date 12 March 1968 1962 12 May 1962
Purpose Plowshare: Row Charge experiment - five simulations detonations Feasibility of using reactor-grade plutonium as a nuclear-explosive material Weapons related
Laboratory LINL (LANL)
Location Nevada Test Site, Buckboard (Nevada Test Site) Nevada test Site
Nuclear-Material Grade (Weapons-grade plutonium) fuel-grade plutonium? (weapons-grade plutonium)
Fissile Fraction (>93% Pu-239 or 93% U-235) fuel-grade plutonium (weapons-grade plutonium)
Nuclear-material origin (95% US/ 5% UK) UK (95% US/ 5% UK)
Explosive Yield 1.08 kt each of 5 explosions <20 kt 40 kt
Weapons Technology (advanced) (advanced)
Nuclear-Material (uranium metal or alpha-phase) (uranium metal or alpha-phase)
Physical/Chemical State (plutonium metal) (plutonium metal)
Test Category crater shaft
Radiation Release detected off site detected on site only

(*)Parentheses surround reasonably assumed information; question marks punctuate ambiguous information

Conclusions
Four types of technical data and two types of non-technical information remain classified or ambiguous about the US 1962 nuclear-explosion with "reactor grade " plutonium. Adequate data concerning the four technical factors--warhead technology, plutonium quality, metallurgical/chemical form, and explosive yield--has already been declassified for weaponized warheads. Information on experiment names and material origins has also been released for most nuclear explosive tests

. The examples in Table 1 show that considerable detail has been declassified for nuclear explosions. Of course, there are other detonations for which little has been declassified. Nevertheless, the two test series included in Table 1 are not unusual; such specific information as nuclear yields has been released for explosions going back to 1946. In addition, inferences about the indicated nuclear explosive experiments can be drawn from other non-specific information found in the public literature.

The glaring shortfall in data and information released about the 1962 test is cause for suspicion about the quality, origin, or success of the experiment. The unreleased information can hardly be of more proliferant value than the specific data already divulged for other nuclear-explosive experiments. In fact, the missing data are likely to be quite discouraging to potential proliferators, thus fortifying existing perceptions about inherent difficulties in weaponization of civilian plutonium. While such reassurances should not give impetus to relaxation of safeguards on the nuclear-fuel cycle, greater disclosure might help devise more cost-effective controls. Based on DOE criteria, no justifiable reason exists to maintain classification of policy-relevant information about the 1962 test.

The author, a physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, has technical and analytical experience in nuclear reactors, arms control, and nonproliferation. This paper expresses solely his personal opinions. A more detailed version of this paper is available upon request.

References

  1. "Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium", U.S. DOE publication DOE FACTS, pp. 186-190 (August 1994).
  2. "Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy: Restricted Data Declassifaction Decisions 1946 to the Present," U.S. DOE Office of Declassification report RDD-3 (1 Jan. 1996).
  3. R. V. Hesketh, private communication.
  4. Nuclear Fuel: 21 (8), pg. 8 (8 April 1996).
  5. A. DeVolpi, Proliferation, Plutonium and Policy: Institutional and Technological Impediments to Nuclear Weapons Propagation, Pergamon, NY 1979.
  6. "Openness Press Conference Fact Sheets," DOE (6 Feb. 1996).
  7. "Plutonium: The First 50 Years: United States plutonium production, acquisition, and utilization from 1944 to 1994," DOE (Feb. 1996).
  8. "Draft Public Guidelines to Department of Energy Classification of Information," U.S. Department of Energy Office of Declassification report (27 June 1994).
  9.  A. DeVolpi, "Denaturing Fissile Materials," Progr. in Nucl. Energy, 10:161 (1982).

A. DeVolpi

More Physical Insight into the Assassination of President Kennedy

The assassination of President Kennedy has been investigated at length by professionals from diverse fields but twenty-three years after this tragic event, the physics community has published little on this matter. There are isolated, albeit important, exceptions such as the revealing physics analysis published by Luis Alvarez.[1] Herein, the Alvarez analysis is extended and new insights are gained which cast doubt on the one gunman, three-bullet theory which is the cornerstone of the findings of the Warren Commission's report.[2]

Physical Basis for the Analysis
The physical basis for analyzing the assassination of President Kennedy is identical with that proposed by Alvarez.[1] Specifically, it is known that disturbances such as the sound of gunfire or the sound of a siren cause neuromuscular reactions that inevitably produce rapid jerking motions of a hand-held camera. These jerking motions cause blurring of the images recorded in the still frames of a motion picture. On first consideration, this phenomenon may appear to be too ill- defined to be of use in shedding light on the assassination of President Kennedy. However, it is well-known that such neuromuscular reactions are involuntary and that the power spectrum for such jerking motions has a peak near a period of about one-third of a second[1]. The results of this article will verify that the angular acceleration of Abraham Zapruder's camera at the only precisely-known time of a shot at President Kennedy -- when President Kennedy was struck in the head -- exhibits the expected characteristics.[1] Such angular acceleration episodes provide clues that shed light on the time-history of the shots fired at President Kennedy limousine as it traveled down Elm Street in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963.

Analysis of the Zapruder Film
The angular acceleration of A. Zapruder' s camera as a function of time may be calculated straightforwardly[1] from the measured streak lengths associated with the blurring of President Kennedy's limousine in the separate frames of the Zapruder film. Since the image on each frame was recorded during the one-thirtieth of a second when the shutter was open, such a streak length in a particular frame is directly proportional to the average angular velocity --- averaged over the one-thirtieth of a second exposure time --- of Zapruder's camera relative to a fixed point on the limousine. During the periods when Zapruder's tracking was steady, there is minimal blurring of the limousine's image since the relevant relative angular velocity of the camera was small. The angular acceleration is the derivative of the angular velocity, so the constant 18.3 frames per second recording speed of Zapruder's camera and the difference in the streak lengths recorded on successive frames can be used to determine angular acceleration.

In calculating the time-series for the angular acceleration of Zapruder's camera it is convenient to adopt the conventions of Ref. 1. Specifically, units and sign conventions are adopted as follows: streak lengths are assigned values from 0, for no streaking, to 5, for maximal streaking; one unit of time is taken to be the 1/18.3 second between successive frames; the sign of the angular velocity is taken as positive if the pointing axis of the camera is advancing in a clockwise sense relative to the limousine as viewed from above the camera in the camera-limousine system; and the sign assigned the angular velocity is negative for counterclockwise relative motion.

The streak lengths in the individual frames recorded by A. Zapruder on November 22, 1963 are readily visible upon inspection of the still frames of the Zapruder film. Alvarez analyzed only frames 171 to 334 since they were apparently the only frames available to him[3]. If he had had access to frames before 171 he would have quickly come to new insights . As pointed out by Alvarez, selected frames of the Zapruder film exhibit blurred images of the President' s limousine that make the limousine appear to have been displaced by as much as a few inches relative to the clear image that would have resulted if the camera had been pointed at the same point on the limousine throughout the one-thirtieth of a second exposure interval. Since the President's limousine was never closer than about seventy feet from Zapruder's camera, a one-inch streak length corresponds to a maximum angular displacement of only about 1/(12*70) = 1/840 of a radian.

The calculated angular accelerations are shown in Figure 1. The frames numbers are indicated along the vertical lines and points to the left of the time-series line indicate clockwise angular accelerations. The fact that the angular acceleration is a more significant indicator of sudden jerking than the angular velocity was emphasized in Ref. 1, but this physical insight was missing completely in the analyses of the consultants to the 1978 U.S. House of Representatives investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.[4] These consultants did analyze Zapruder frames before 171 but they based their analyses on the simple magnitude of the streaking of each frame as well as on the fluctuations of the absolute direction of the camera's optical axis. Unfortunately, contributions to these angular displacements and angular velocities come from both gradual fluctuations and rapid changes in the pointing direction of the camera, but it is only the rapid variations that. are sensitive indicators of responses to disturbances such as the sounds of gunfire or a siren.

The angular-acceleration time series displayed on the second through sixth vertical lines of Figure 1 is an excellent approximation to that published in Ref. 1. However, the angular- acceleration episode on the first vertical line is completely absent in Ref. 1, because Alvarez used the Zapruder frames published in Ref. 2 which did not include frames before 171. The four angular-acceleration episodes commencing at frames 180, 220, 290 and 313 were explained in Ref. 1 as follows:

--- Based on the clear visual evidence, the episode beginning at frame 313 is unambiguously assigned to the shot that struck President Kennedy in the head.

--Since the Warren Commission asserted that there were three shot fired on November 22. 1963 with the first shot missing its target and since President Kennedy was holding his throat on emerging from behind a street sign on Elm Street at the time of frame 224, the angular-acceleration episode commencing at frame 220 was associated with the "magic-bullet" shot that presumably caused seven wounds to President Kennedy and Governor Connally.

-- The angular acceleration episode commencing at frame 180 was associated with the bullet that missed its target since it was the only episode known to Alvarez that occurred before frame 220.

-- Finally, to explain the angular-acceleration episode that begins at frame 290, it was noted that a siren sounded at about the time of the bullet that struck President Kennedy in the head.

The association of the blast of a siren with the angular-acceleration episode that begins at frame 290 was made by Alvarez[1] but he stated clearly that he was not sure this assignment was correct. Indeed, as correctly pointed out by Alvarez, most eyewitnesses claimed that siren sounded after the fatal wound to President Kennedy's head. These witnesses held that the siren first sounded well after frame 313 and the siren could not be responsible for the angular-acceleration episode that began at frame 290. Alvarez points out[1] that eyewitnesses frequently have flawed memories of stressful events, but it is difficult, indeed, to understand why many witnesses[2] would make the same error. At any rate, these are the interpretations made in Ref. 1 for the four angular acceleration episodes beginning at frames 180, 220, 290 and 313. The interpretation of Ref. 1 appears to be consistent with the Warren Commission's conclusion that there was no conspiracy since a single gunman could have fired the three shots associated with the angular-acceleration episodes commencing at frames 180, 220, and 313.

With these assignments of times for the three sounds of gunfire and one siren blast, it was possible for Alvarez to state that the available scientific evidence supported the findings of the Warren Commission. However, if Alvarez had had access to frames before 171 he would have discovered that there was a fifth angular-acceleration episode that commenced at frame 152, about 1.5 seconds before the time of the "first shot" identified in Ref. 1. The magnitude of this episode is accentuated by the fact that the limousine is farther from the camera at frame 152 than at frames 180 to 334 but there can be no doubt that the angular-acceleration time series beginning at frame 152 represents a sudden jerking motion of Zapruder's camera.[5] It is significant that the time interval is only 1.5 seconds in duration because investigators[4] have agreed consistently that the minimum firing time between shots with the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the sniper's nest on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository was 2.25 seconds.

Discussion and Conclusions
By following Alvarez's prescription of taking the differences between streak lengths to obtain angular accelerations, it is straightforward to construct a time-series of the angular-acceleration of A. Zapruder's camera as he filmed President Kennedy's limousine as it traveled down Elm Street in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963. This extended time-series contains a strong angular- acceleration episode which commences during the interval from frame 152 to frame 153, which was not discovered by Alvarez because he analyzed only the frames that were reproduced in the Warren's Commission's report. The most easily drawn conclusion from the extended time series is that the angular-acceleration episode commencing at frame 152 occurs about 1.5 seconds before the time which Ref. 1 denotes as the "first shot". This is a significant conclusion because the angular- acceleration episodes beginning at frames 152 and 180 could not have been caused by shots fired by one person using the Mannlicher-Carcano that was found on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository[2].

The establishment of this fifth jerking episode of Zapruder's camera makes it extremely difficult to use Alvarez's method to support the Warren Commission's single-gunman, three bullet theory and their conclusion that there was no conspiracy. Critics of the Alvarez analysis may hold that the techniques of Ref. 1 are just not suitable technique for shedding insight in the assassination of President Kennedy. However, in this case it would also be impossible to use this analysis to support the findings of the Warren Commission. This conclusion is especially significant for the physics community since Ref. 1 is the only paper published in the physics literature that attempts to use physical data and laws to understand the assassination of President Kennedy.[6]

References

  1. L. Alvarez, Am. J. Phys., 44, 83 (1976).
  2.  Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John
  3. F. Kennedy, Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, with twenty-six volumes on Hearings and Exhibits, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964; also published by Associated Press, Bantam, Doubleday, McGraw-Hill, and Popular Library, 1964.
  4. The Warren Commission's report published only frames 171 to 343; however, today there are many commercially-available videos containing the full Zapruder film including the earlier frames from 150 to 171 which also recorded the motion of President Kennedy's limousine after it had turned on to Elm Street on November 22, 1963.
  5. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1979.
  6. It is unfortunate that frames 155 and 156 of the Zapruder film are missing. However, the absence of these frames does not change the conclusion that a rapid jerking motion of Zapruder's camera began at frame 152. In the analysis done for the present article, it was rediscovered that these frames are missing. This rediscovery was made from the fact that in the first existing frame following frame 154, the limousine appears to have traveled three times its normal frame-to-frame distance; in fact, it has been known for many years that frames 155 and 156 have been removed from the Zapruder film. What is unknown is why the frames were removed and who removed them. It is also not known when these frames were removed. What is well-known is that the Zapruder film was kept from the public for many years; for a portion of this time it was retained by those who had paid A. Zapruder for rights to the film. Today, the Zapruder film is copyrighted and those wishing to reproduce, and make general use, of the frames from this famous film are asked to negotiate suitable terms through the Washington, DC law firm represented by James Lorin Silverberg, Esquire.
  7.  The Report on the Committee on Ballistic Acoustics, National Academy Press. Washington, DC, 1982 as summarized in Science, Volume 218, page 127, 1982 does apply the laws of physics but this Committee, under the chairmanship of Norman F. Ramsey, concluded that suspected sounds on gunfire recorded on the Dallas Police Department' s dictaphone recorders could not have been gunfire since the receiving microphones were not turned on in Dealey Plaza, Dallas, Texas during the few seconds when shots were fired at President Kennedy on November 22, 1963. The Committee concluded that these suspected sounds of gunfire were recorded about one minute after shots were fired and that these noises were therefore not due to gunfire. The nature of this study is distinctly different from that of Ref. 1: the National Academy of Sciences study concluded that no relevant physical data existed on the Dallas Police Department's audio recordings.

Figure 1. Angular-acceleration time series versus frame number displayed along six vertical lines. Points to the left of the vertical time-series lines denote clockwise angular accelerations as described in the text.

Michael A. Stroscio

Physics Department, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708

In Search of an IMPROVED Science and Public-Policy Process

Taking the lead from the play Cabaret, I assert that it is "both substance and process that makes the world go 'round." Usually, it is preferable to write about substance, but this brief paper will attempt to deal with the unglamorous issues of "process."

Historians tell us that there are many driving forces of history, such as the forces of great persons, the forces that divide or unite nations, and the forces between competing economic systems. My personal conclusion is that science and technology is the foremost driving force of history. What we scientists and engineers discover, the industrialists will produce and society will consume. Take away modern agricultural, military, transportation and communication technologies and a very different society appears. It is clear that society is not going to follow the mythical Ned Ludd to destroy our looms, autos and CD players.

Along with this primal role of creation, physicists have the concomitant responsibility to do our best to determine the impacts of implementation. This is serious business. There is no room for errors of omission or commission. Because the stakes are very high and because science means knowledge, we are obligated to be honest, objective, and open. Too often our analysis fails to mention major uncertainties and competing issues that are not directly comparable. It is our job to lay out all the facts and ask the hard questions.

In my talk at the APS spring meeting, I gave some examples of issues in which I observed a less than stellar science/technology (S/T) policy process, such as:

  • lurching towards a plutonium policy in the 1970s
  • determining the appropriate level of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War
  • debating the extent and significance of Soviet cheating
  • considering a 2 mGauss standard for powerlines.

These and other examples have convinced me that the S/T decision process needs help. I would argue that today's general cynicism of rational thought undercuts S/T policy process. As part of this, the anti-science movement has contributed to an environment in which the issues can be clouded and mishandled. This movement is not new -- it has been with us before Galileo was put under house arrest. Our main hope is the credibility of our scientific citizens who use an open, peer-reviewed process to state our limitations and uncertainties. Some ideas on improving the S/T public policy process are:

1. Individual ethics. The 1991 APS statement on "Guidelines for Professional Conduct" and the 1993 AAAS position paper on "Good Science and Responsible Scientists" are excellent statements -- as far as they go -- on nonfabrication of data, authorship, peer review and conflict of interests. In my view, the importance of S/T issues demands a stricter, more pro-active code of ethics. This demands a discussion of:

  • uncertainties, ranges of estimates in numbers, and opinions and lists of omissions
  • criteria, such as Hill's on epidemiology, for replicability, linearity for small effects, plausibility with regard to basic laws, coherence of data, possible confounders, economics, etc.
  • peer-review comments from a wide group of reviewers
  • condemnation of those who favor your conclusions, but who use data incorrectly or overstate the case
  • responses to questions from nonpartisan ombudsmen who represent truth-seeking as compared to advocacy.

2. A non-adjudicatory process to determine areas of agreement and disagreement. In the 1970s, there was a flurry of interest in Arthur Kantrowitz's concept[1] of the Science Court in which scientific experts would be the judges and "case managers." These individuals were to be unconnected to the dispute with the hope of removing hard-charging advocacy. The science court was not to be empowered to make judicial decisions, but only to give recommendations to the courts or decision makers.

For a variety of conflicting reasons, the Science Court did not survive, but an excellent result appeared from its byproduct, the Scientific Adversary Procedure. In 1985, under the leadership of Kantrowitz, Edward Gerry (in favor of SDI) and Richard Garwin (in opposition) discussed under formal procedures and drew up a list of agreed statements that both could support. If the fifteen agreed statements had been widely publicized and ultimately accepted as honest output from two excellent scientists who fundamentally disagreed, the SDI debate could have been narrowed and made more rational. For example, consider statement #9: "In the continuing context of deterrence of nuclear war by threat of retaliation, technologies already exist to solve the problem of strategic force vulnerability sooner and at a lower cost than via layered defense with space components." Acceptance of this statement would have clearly helped to narrow the many classified technical meetings on SDI which I attended during the 1980s. At the time, it seemed that the government was locked into an unjustified kill probability of 0.9 in its discussions of the highly complex "preferential targeting" of reentry vehicles. If the Garwin-Gerry results had been read in executive branch and congressional meetings, it would have considerably raised the level of discussion.

3. Questions for the record. Sometimes the Congress has done a good job of handling controversial S/T issues, but often it has not. The Congress has a unique opportunity to produce hearing records with penetrating follow-up questions from and to experts. However, the members of Congress often feel that hearing records are of little importance and they are often printed after the issue has been settled. These decisions are often made by non-scientists who don't care about setting the record straight and don't worry about clarifying the issues. For example, the concern that nuclear waste to be stored at Yucca Mountain might explode could have been rapidly clarified with some penetrating technical questions to those on both sides of the issue. It would not have taken a great deal of effort to show what had and had not been calculated. Of course the National Academy of Science can and does perform this task, but it often seems to take too long for the NAS to produce its product and the system often doesn't know how to absorb it. And, of course, we can all think of an Academy study that we thought was wrong!

4. Benevolent Ombudspersons. Science must be honest, objective, and open, and the same holds for S/T policy. If two divergent groups of honest scientists could work together and prepare an annual report of errors and overstatements on the S/T issues, this would put pressure on scientists to pay attention to the code of ethics discussed above. The American Physical Society has the credible intellectual talent to do this, but I can't imagine the APS would want to get involved in all of the issues. Perhaps two nongovernmental organizations with differing constituents could develop panels of impeccable scientists to ask questions of the proponents and assess who went beyond the truth. This begins to sound like "Accuracy in the Media," but I am hopeful that our scientific training would make the difference for removing "lies, damn-lies and bad statistics."

5. Other. I am still searching for the perfect wave. Paraphrasing A.E. Houseman's "A Shropshire Lad;" When I was one-and-twenty I heard a wise man say "Give me scientific facts and logical thought and the society will choose wisely." Now I am almost two-and-sixty, And Oh, 'tis not always true, 'tis not always true.

Footnote:

1. A. Kantrowitz, American Scientist 63, 505-509 (1975). Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, Science 193, 653-656 (1976). P. Boffey, Science 194, 167-169 (1976). B. Casper, Science 194, 29-35 (1976). S. Jasanoff and D. Nelkin, Science 214, 1211-1215 (1981).

David Hafemeister

Physics Department, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407

Rethinking Science as a Career: Perceptions and Realities in the Physical Sciences

Sheila Tobias, Daryl Chubin, and Kevin Aylesworth

Research Corporation, Tucson, Arizona, 1995, ISBN 0-9633504-3-9

There is an automobile ad on TV that asks the question, "If we violate the laws of physics will we be punished?" It seems that in physics we have been asking a similar question of economists, "If we violate the laws of supply and demand, will we be punished?" This book implies that "not necessarily" is an appropriate answer to the second question. All we have to do is change the laws.

Using non-random sampling from author-composed questionairres (pp. 130-138), some statistical analysis and anecdotal evidence (some from the Young Scientists Network), the authors present answers to questions of how to balance supply of and demand for scientifically trained professionals. The scientists surveyed are physical scientists, mainly physicists and chemists, who have completed an undergraduate degree and are in various stages of pursuing a career in physical science. The apparent goal of the book is to "put a human face on the (employment) situation as it currently exists, to map out problems along with possibilities, and to suggest ways in which higher education, the federal government, and the science community itself can develop different strategies for projecting and preparing human resources in science the 21st century" (p.12). The book addresses these issues in an engaging and relatively comprehensive way. One notable omission is the preparation and supply of scientist- teachers for a career in elementary and high schools; a topic of utmost importance if we hope to promote, as the authors suggest, the general view that "human resources in science are a national treasure that add value to the world."

To get a handle on the current employment situation and perception of it, the first two chapters are devoted to reviewing the traditional perceptions of the scientist, the scientists' job and the overall place of science in the U.S. economy. One of the most important questions posed in the first chapter is whether the shifts in employment of scientists is cyclical (i.e., closely tied to economic trends) or structural (i.e., closely tied to educational programs and government support of them) (p. 25). Assuming a structural cause, the rest of the book is devoted to supporting this hypothesis and suggesting changes in educational programs and in government and university support.

Suggestions include offering [graduate] degrees that include coursework and experiences with business to prepare graduates for the working world. These might include business and political science courses and summer work.

The next two chapters summarize responses to the questionnaires in an effort to identify the current set of skills required by a working scientist. This skill set is discussed in comparison with what is traditionally taught to students preparing for a career in science. A question this section raises is whether professors, mentors and teachers should prepare students for a job or "give students an education." Undergraduate education at liberal arts universities require programs of general studies to give breadth of experience to all students, including science majors. There is no mention of the role these general studies courses play or should play in preparing students for the workforce. Another issue raised in these chapters is the role business should play in shaping education. The face of academia may change if universities are forced to look more toward business to fund their programs, rather than looking toward state and federal agencies. Such a scenario begs the question, "Who will define the primary responsibilities of science?"

The last two chapters focus on how a degree in science might lead to a science career, not necessarily one in academic/research science. Educating students in science so that they possess "commercially oriented" scientific skills is proposed by the authors as a way to "restructure supply" (e.g., business driving academia). Certainly most Ph.D.s with dissertation work in string theory possess analytical, computational, and communication skills equal to those of a Ph.D. in theoretical condensed matter physics. But business may not be so ready to fund the former line of research. It is conceivable that such close ties with business may not be good for science.

Other suggestions, prompted by answers to the questionairres indicating too-narrow training, include offering M.S. and Ph.D. degrees that include coursework and/or co-op experiences with business to better prepare graduates for the non-academic, non-research- oriented working world. Such courses and co-ops might include business and political science courses and summer work during a graduate degree program. The authors anticipate resistance from faculty expected to institute such changes due to traditional faculty attitudes about what a successful scientist does (p. 86). Another reason for this resistance, not given by the authors, may be that it is hard to imagine these sorts of programs without sacrificing the depth of knowledge necessary to produce a dissertation, or without increasing the already lengthy time to finish a Ph.D. The book provides little evidence to support such radical changes in advanced degree programs, but such changes may be warrented with more study of these issues.

The questionnaires are given in the appendices with results of the multiple choice questions. They provide some interesting insight into opinions about employment problems facing scientifically trained professionals. For example, in response to the question "Do you believe there is a coming shortage of scientists and engineers in the U.S.?" 38 of 71 respondents answered "no" and 33 answered "yes" (p. 138). This result hints at a lack of consensus concerning the perception of the employment situation faced by physical scientists.

Recognizing the employment situation for what it is is important for anyone who has the responsibility of advising students planning on a career in physical science. This book provides a very useful introduction to employment issues in physical science and provides many provocative ideas for addressing these issues if the cause is structural.

Maria Falbo-Kenkel
Department of Physics & Geology
Northern Kentucky University

Lise Meitner: A Life in Physics

Ruth Sime

University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, ISBN 0-520-08906-5

Do women make good scientists? As Ruth Sime informs us in the introduction of her biography of Lise Meitner, a determined oversight in the hands of historians has ensured that numerous women scientists have been undervalued and fallen into obscurity. This trend apparently perpetuates the belief that women are usually less able than their male colleagues. Evidence to the contrary, claims Sime, rarely makes it into print.

In addition to documenting Meitner's scientific achievements, Sime's detailed telling of Meitner's personal struggles and convictions ensures that Meitner's life will stand as a testimony to the equal capacity of women as scientists.

From childhood Lise was curious about mathematics and science and photos of her show her to be a pensive young woman. Reform in women's education and support from her parents allowed Lise to enter the University of Vienna in 1901 and set her on her life-long commitment to physics. One of her teachers was Ludwig Boltzmann, an inspiring and brilliant scientist who was extremely open minded concerning women's education and made a lasting impression on Lise. Having obtained her doctorate (one of only two women that year to do so) and proving to herself that she was capable of independent research, she arrived in Berlin in 1907 with a small allowance from her parents to study for a few terms at the university. She stayed for more than thirty years.

In Berlin, Max Planck allowed her to attend his lectures. Emil Fischer, director at the institute for Chemistry, agreed to let her collaborate with a young German chemist, Otto Hahn, who shared a common interest with Lise in the new field of radioactivity. However, because women were still barred professionally, Fischer would only let Lise work in the old wood shop in the basement of his building, which had a separate entrance. Nevertheless Hahn and Meitner, of similar age, instantaneously became friends.

In 1912, when Hahn was offered a junior position at the new Kaiser-Wilhelm- Institute fur Chemie (KWI) in Dahlem to run a modest radioactivity section, Lise Meitner was welcome too--as unpaid "guest" despite her twenty or so excellent join publications with Hahn. She was rewarded for her persistence when later in 1912 Max Planck appointed her as his assistant--the first woman assistant in Prussia. Fischer took note and within a year she became a scientific associate in the KWI. When Lise was asked in 1917 to establish a physics department at the institute, she believed this to be a sign of recognition, trust and professional "coming of age," and struck out on her own in the new field of nuclear physics. In 1919 she became a full professor. Using the Wilson bubble chamber which she built in 1924, Meitner made thorough investigations of the emission and scattering of alpha particles. Otto Hahn, now WKI director, noted that it was her work, more than his own, that contributed to the growing international reputation of their institute.

In 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointed German chancellor. Shortly after, the National Socialists effected the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service." All non-Aryans and political undesirables were to be purged from all government agencies. Over a very short time Jews were systematically dismissed from all civil service positions. Meitner did not know whether to follow Einstein and many other friends, and to resign and leave the country or whether to ride out the troubles. She could not believe that the situation could be sustained for long. Moreover the institute was her haven, her home, her reference point.

Meitner responded to the National Socialist threat by proposing that Hahn and she renew their collaboration. In 1934, Meitner, Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, an outspoken anti-Nazi who was almost destitute as a result of the political unrest, teamed up to investigate the elements beyond Uranium. This project eventually culminated in the discovery of fission at the end of 1938.

Although immediately after the war Lise Meitner was a celebrity in the United States, after her death in 1968 she seemed like so many other women scientists to be disappearing into obscurity. In 1944 Hahn received the Nobel prize for physics in recognition of the discovery of Nuclear fission. Meitner and Strassmann did not. Ultimately, Hahn and fellow German scientists even hinted that had Meitner stayed in Berlin, she would have probably hindered Hahn from making his discovery. In this case "the systematic repression and forgetting of post-war Germany," as Sime describes it, made it all the more convenient to diminish Meitner's contributions. Sime sets herself the task of uncovering the facts around the discovery of nuclear fission and placing Meitner as the intellectual leader of the Berlin team.

Realization of nuclear fission was reached by common effort through secret communication between Hahn in Berlin and Mietner in Stockholm. Hahn never acknowledged this later. Resident in different countries, both Meitner and Hahn needed the acclaim to provide them with professional and financial security. Hahn, to his credit, was not a Nazi party member, and communicating the results in secret only to Meitner without telling physicists at his own institution caused him untold friction at the WKI. His position there was for a time quite unstable. However, when the enormity of their discovery was realized, this became a turning point in their relationship. Hahn distanced himself from Meitner initially for political reasons, and it became his self-interest to discredit any contribution she had made as a physicist.

Lise Meitner was a brilliant and capable woman who, so familiarly for her gender, lacked confidence in her ability. Her response was always muted in public. In 1938 when she fled to Stockholm, she was mislead to believe that in Manne Siegbahm's Nobel Institute for Experimental Physics she could really contribute to setting up useful research programmes. In fact she was despised and not welcomed. Siegbahm allowed her the most basic of facilities and no staff. Combined with the fact that she had left all of her personal and scientific possessions in Berlin, she was reduced to living in a small hotel room with insufficient changes of clothes. Added to this were her own worries for members of her family still stranded in Germany.

This book is an extraordinary and rewarding read and I can not sing its praises too strongly. I have dipped into it over and again and each time it stimulates anew. It is balanced and fair. It presents the complete personal and scientific relationship between Hahn and Meitner. Many correspondences are included which add considerable weight and authenticity to Sime's line of argument. The photographs and text document the development of nuclear physics just prior to its loss of innocence--one of the most fertile periods of scientific progress.

Sime has written the definitive biography of Lise Meitner and much more. In all respects this book deserves to be read.

Dr L.F. Cohen
Blackett Laboratory, Imperial College
Prince Consort Rd London SW7 2BZ.

Article Reviews: Four Articles On Climate Change

With this issue, we begin publishing brief reviews of journal and magazine articles. If you come across significant articles that other FPS members could benefit from, please write your own brief (200 words maximum) review and send it to me (my addresses are on the Forum home page). - Art Hobson, reviews editor

Consequences
Consequences is a serious new journal devoted to "the nature and implications of environmental change." It is produced as a public service to provide reliable assessments of practical concerns related to national and international consequences of global environmental changes. It is published quarterly and distributed free through funding by NOAA, NASA and NSF. Articles are commissioned from working scientists with professional expertise. Manuscripts are critically reviewed by independent experts, representing a spectrum of opinion, whose names and credentials appear with each article. Articles are written for the informed public reader, kept to a length that can be read in about half an hour, and preceded by a short summation. Articles are also accessible at http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/introCON.html

Trends in U.S. Climate during the Twentieth Century
Thomas Karl, Richard Knight, David Easterling, Robert Quayle

Consequences Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, pp. 2-12.

Karl's group has developed a Greenhouse Climate Response Index (GCRI) that is the annual arithmetic average of four U.S. climate indicators related to temperature, preciptiation, drought, and extreme one-day precipation. Theoretical understanding of global warming predicts that these indicators should be especially sensitive to greenhouse-induced climate change. This article describes the observed behavior of the GCRI since 1910, and the implications for climate change. According to the article, "it can be concluded that the late-century changes recorded in U.S. climate are consistent with the general trends anticipated from a greenhouse-enhanced atmosphere. --The tendency toward increased values of the U.S. GCRI over the past two decades is suggestive of a climate driven by greenhouse warming. At the same time--one cannot unequivocally reject the possbility (about a 5 to 10% chance) that the increase is still a feature of a stable climate." A brief report on Karl's work appears in the journal Science, 21 April 1995, pp. 363-4.

Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture and Food Supply
Cynthia Rosenzweig and Daniel Hillel

Consequences Vol. 1, No. 2, 1995, pp. 22-32.

Possible benefits include enhanced CO2 assimilation, longer growing seasons, and increased preciptation. Possible drawbacks include more frequent and severe droughts, heat stress, faster growth, shorter growing periods, shortened lifecycle, sea-level rise, increased flooding and increased salinization. The article discusses the effects of higher CO2, higher temperature, water availability, climate variability, soil fertility, erosion, pests, diseases, sea-level rise, and agricultural adaptation. It also discusses uncertainties in predictions about these changes, thresholds at which new effects might occur, and the possibilities for surprise. In closing, the authors offer two opinions. First, "the term 'threshold' is misleading whenever artificially contrived levels are specified rather than natural thresholds." That is, we should not set "acceptable" levels for human-produced emission rates of CO2 and other substances. "The eventual consequences of ANY significant human alteration of the Earth's energy balance is potentially serious." And, "The second notion, which can be equally misleading, is a blind faith in agriculture as a self-correcting process. --The efforts of farmers may well be constrained or even thwarted by factors beyond their control."

Climate Models: How Reliable are their Predictions?
Eric Barron

Consequences Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp. 16-27.

How certain or how controversial are the largely theoretical predictions of global warming, and on what assumptions are they based? Given the potential importance of regional climate changes, and the impacts of extreme, climate-related weather events such as droughts, floods, and hurricanes on agriculture and human safety, how reliable are the projections? Are the uncertainties in present models so great that we can ignore their predictions? What elements are the most robust? Are there prospects for substantial near-term improvements in climate models? These questions were put to a group of scientists, chaired by Barron, in late l994 in response to requests from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Government Accounting Office. The result, summarized in this article, is a ranked list of 16 climate model predictions ranging from "virtually certain" (there is only one, namely that the stratosphere will be significantly cooled) through "very probable" (continued temperature rise, increased precipitation, diminished sea ice, rising sea levels, warmer wintertime arctic land areas, greenhouse effects will be much larger than the climatic effects of any changes in the sun's radiated energy), down to "probable" (four more effects) and "uncertain" (five effects). This is followed by a list of seven steps that could be taken to reduce the uncertainties in present models.

Remembrance of Things Past: Greenhouse Lessons from the Geologic Record
Thomas Crowley

Consequences Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, 2-12.

One hundred million years of climate change, placed within the perspective of several different time-frames: the past 1000 years, the past 18,000 years, the past 160,000 years, the past 800,000 years, and the past 100 million years. The final sentance of the article states "The net impression of this evaluation is that the future climate promises to look very different than the present and, perhaps more disconcertingly, possibly unlike anything known before."

Forum Executive Committee Session at the Indianapolis APS/AAPT Meeting Summary

The Executive Committee of our Forum met on May 4, 1996, and took care of the following business:

The results of our Forum election were accepted by ExComm. Considering the very low turnout for the election, the committee's acceptance of the results may essentially represent some kind of electoral redundancy.

The nominating committee is having trouble finding a sufficient number of nominees for our elections. Just think: If we continue in this vein, plus impose term limits on the ExComm, then a future roster of Forum officers might consist of {The Null Set}.

A short course entitled "Military Technologies in the Post Cold-War World" is being planned for the time of the Washington, D.C. meeting in April 1997. More details later.

Budgets are a' tightenin' all over: This year, for the first time, APS billed our Forum $236 for EACH certificate for the Szilard Award winners. As Szilard's friends and admirers used to say, "What would Leo think?"

It was agreed that electronic messages should be sent to the entire Forum membership only on rare occasions. Phewph!

The editing that Art Hobson used to do single-handedly for P&S is now being done by a committee. (This should go a long way to explaining the coherence [or lack of it] of our latest issues of P&S.)

Both invited and contributed sessions at the St. Louis APS meeting were viewed as successful, so both types of sessions will be continued. The program committee is looking into the possibility that P&S will sponsor sessions at APS meetings other than the two spring meetings.

We are in the black! In fact, FY 1995 showed a net gain of over $5k on our books, which comes to $1.29/member. However, there was no discussion whatsoever of decreasing our annual Forum membership fee by $1.29, or even just a measly buck. Instead, the minutes indicate that "The committee agreed to retain the surplus". Aha! Now we know the real reason why so many physicists make trips to Switzerland!

Forum members have worked substantially on questions of jobs and education and have collaborated with others in APS, AIP, and AAPT to identify where action was required. Forum members have worked to develop a tutorial for faculty on how they can help students better prepare for diverse careers as well as help locate specific job opportunities.

The minutes of the meeting indicate that the meeting was stopped 4 hours after it started, but that adjournment didn't occur until an additional half-hour passed(??). During that half-time, decisions were made to continue compiling a joint program of titles and papers for all invited sessions of all the Forums, and to e-mail this well before the spring meetings to the joint membership of all Forums.

(N.B.: The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Executive Committee, and probably shouldn't be. For anybody who wants to read the REAL minutes of our ExComm meeting, you can access it via our home page on the WWW. These minutes are here. Marc Sher has done an outstanding job of creating a terrific Web site for our Forum.)

Forum Executive Committee Session at the Indianapolis APS/AAPT Meeting Minutes

Attending: Alvin Saperstein (chair), Ed Gerjuoy (chair-elect), John Ahearne (vice-chair) Michael Sobel (secretary/treasurer), J.D. Garcia (incoming member-at-large), Dave Hafemeister (POPA chair), Art Hobson (past newsletter editor), Daniel Kammen (member-at-large), Barbara Levi (past forum councillor), Tony Nero (past chair), Dietrich Schroeer (forum councillor), Marc Sher (member-at-large)

Thee meeting was called to order at 1:35 PM by Al Saperstein.

Copies of the minutes of the 1995 executive committee meeting were distributed and were approved. The election report was distributed by Mike Sobel. In the recent election, William Colglazier was elected vice-chair, and J.D. Garcia and Duncan Moore were elected to the executive committee. Although a problem had arisen because Colglazier's membership in APS had lapsed, he subsequently re-joined APS and the Forum. The executive committee therefore accepted the election results.

Dietrich Schroeer submitted a report on the work of the nominating committee, discussing why the slate was submitted late and with too few nominees, and offering recommendations. FPS is now competing with POPA and other foruias for a small pool of active people. The nominating committee should get a good start before the summer. Ed Gerjuoy suggested that members of the nominating committee be given a time-line for the nomination process. Tony Nero suggested that Forum members be requested via e-iaail to propose nominees, as well as to propose fellows and session topics for meetings.

Dave Hafemeister reported that POPA is re-considering its role in APS. It has not sponsored a major research study in 9 years, and funding for such is not likely to be available. POPA has sponsored smaller studies which are largely evaluations of the literature by one individual, such as the recent reports on electromagnetic radiation and on the helium supply.

Hafemeister and Schroeer proposed that Forum sponsor a short course on "Military Technologies in the Post Cold-War World". This would be held around the time of the Washington meeting in April 1997, and would lead to a book based on the talks. They requested a "loan" of $1,000 for planning this course, expecting that the program would probably break even. There was some concern that, because the APS meeting will run over a weekend, the short course might have to be held on weekdays, leading to reduced attendance. After further discussion, the committee approved the request by a vote of 6 to 1.

For the fellowship committee, John Ahearne reported that 5 candidates are being proposed, although application forms are not all complete yet. He suggested we give more thought to looking beyond those with whom people work regularly.

A discussion followed concerning the awards sponsored by the Forum, including the matter of expenses for travel and for certificates. This year, for the first time, APS billed the Forum for the cost of certificates for the Szilard Award ($236 each). We co-sponsor the Nicholson Award, which "recognizes the humanitarian aspects of physics and physicists", with the Plasma Physics Division. The executive committee agreed to continue to co-sponsor the award, but Ed Gerjuoy will talk with the Plasma Physics Division about possible overlaps with the Forum and Szilard Awards, and about funding for travel and certificates.

Some comments were made about appropriate use of electronic communication. Messages delivered to the entire Forum membership should be relatively rare. Messages delivered to the executive committee should be prioritized as either "for your information" or "action required". Al Saperstein had been asked by a member of another forum to transmit a message with some political content to all FPS meabers, and he asked the executive committee's advice. The committee decided that in general we should not accede to such requests, and that we would not in the present case.

The editorial board of Physics and Society had proposed a new editorial staff, and the proposal was approved by the executive committee via e-mail prior to this meeting. The staff is: Al Saperstein, editor-in-chief; Art Hobson, book-review editor; Lee Sorrell, article editor; Jeff Marque, news editor.

Marc Sher reported that the newsletter in now on the world-wide-web. Visitors can call up not only newsletter articles, but also items referred to in articles, including government documents. The hard copy will continue to be sent, but starting with the October 1996 issue, an electronic version will be produced An e-mail notice will be sent to all Forum members giving three options for receiving the newsletter electronically: (1) a postscript version will be mailed every quarter, (2) a PDF version will be mailed every quarter, or (3) the table of contents will be mailed along with the web address. In the last case, the member can download postscript or PDF versions of the newsletter, or just read the web version. It was moved, seconded, and approved that we thank Marc for his work on this.

For the program committee, Ed Gerjuoy reported that the sessions at the St. Louis meeting and at this meeting went well and were well-attended, and also that the contributed paper sessions went well. The committee agreed that we should continue to arrange contributed sessions, and Tony Nero will work on this. There was some discussion of the pros and cons of holding APS meetings at less-than-major cities like Indianapolis. The possibility was raised of sponsoring sessions at APS meetings other than the two spring meetings, and the program committee will look into it.

Mike Sobel presented a budget report, with final transactions for fiscal year 1995, and projected transactions for fiscal 1996. FY 1995 showed a net gain of $5,341, because the cost of the July 1995 newsletter was charged to FY 1996, and because projected expenses for the spring 1995 meetings did not materialize. The FY 1996 budget projects a small surplus, but income from the spring 1996 meetings is not yet known. The committee agreed to retain the surplus.

For the membership committee, Bob Ehrlich submitted a written report. The committee e-mailed a promotional letter to Forum members, asking them to forward it to colleagues. A request to the APS to transmit the letter to the entire membership was turned down. Current Forum membership is 4,142.

Al Saperstein had appointed three ad hoc committees at the beginning of his term: environment and energy; jobs and careers; and public attitudes towards science. Reports were that not much was done by these committees. Forum members, however, have worked substantially on questions of jobs and education, and worked with other forums and with APS, AlP, and AAPT to identify where action was required. Forum members have organized sessions, and have worked to develop a tutorial for faculty on how they can help students better prepare for diverse careers, as well as help locate specific job opportunities.

Barry Ripin stopped by the meeting at 5:30. He reported that the next APS billing WILL have a listing of current unit membership. This should avoid the loss of enrollment that occurred after the last billing.

The report of the Forum Councillor is contained primarily in Barbara Levi's article in the April 1996 Newsletter. The question of the relation between the Forum and POPA was raised. Dave Hafemeister noted that many of the POPA members are people who have been active in the Forum. We will recommend that there be a Forum liaison to POPA. Hafemeister will recommend that a Forum member who is already on POPA be appointed liaison.

As for relations with other forums, the committee voted to continue the practice of compiling a joint program of titles and papers for all invited sessions of all the Forums, and e-mailing this well before the spring meetings to the joint membership of all forums. As before, Tony Nero agreed to take care of this.

As incoming chair, Ed Gerjuoy brought up the question of the purpose of the annual business meeting, since there seems to be little interest among the membership. At some APS units there is considerable interest and attendance, but at others there is not. The meeting, however, may be required by the APS Constitution One suggestion was to schedule the business meeting prior to the Forum awards session, or between two Forum sessions.

Gerjuoy said that new committee members have not yet been selected, and there have been no volunteers in response to his message in the last newsletter. He urged outgoing of ficers and committee chairs to prepare an advisory report for their successors, with a copy to the Secretary/Treasurer. Thus a file of useful and often hard-to-obtain information would be available to incoming chairs and officers.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:00 PM.

Michael T. Sobel Secretary/Treasurer

AIP Corporate Associates Meeting

The annual Corporate Associates meeting of the American Institute of Physics will take place October 28-29, 1996 in Ridgefield, Connecticut. The meeting is being hosted by Schlumberger-Doll Research in Ridgefield, and the theme of the meeting is "Energy for the 21st Century". All are welcome to register for attendance. The first day of the program includes a theme session on energy (with talks entitled "Energy and Development in a Greening World", "Climate Friendly Energy Technologies", "Seismic Exploration and Reservoir Characterization", and "Borehole Applications of Magnetic Resonance"), a talk by DOE's Director of Energy Research, Martha Krebs ("The Role of DOE Energy R&D in the Nation's Future Energy Supply"), a tour of Schlumberger-Doll Research Laboratories, and an evening banquet/award/anniversary ceremony.

The second day includes a policy session on industrial research and product development in a global environment, with participants from Schlumberger, Xerox, NEC, and General Motors. There will also be presentations on the frontiers of physics including talks on granular systems, organic semiconductors, newly-discovered planets, and geological patterns.

Registration by October 4, 1996 should be sent to AIP, Executive Director's Office, One Physics Ellipse, College Park, MD 20740, including $225 for all the sessions and all the food events, or $150 for just the sessions. Call the AIP at (301)-209-3131 for further details regarding fees, hotel reservations, reservations for the Schlumberger-Doll tour, etc.

Your organization might also want to consider applying to join the AIP Corporate Associates, annual dues for which are between $600 and $6000 depending on how many physicists are employed in your organization. The phone number given above should be used for membership inquiries.

Forum Participation in APS Centenary Program

The Centennial Meeting of the American Physical Society is scheduled for March 1999 in Atlanta. APS has set up a committee, chaired by Brian Schwartz, to plan the celebration; Heinz Barschall of the University of Wisconsin has been designated as the liaison person of our Forum with the Centenary Program Committee. The Committee would like: (1) suggested names and topics for a Centenary Speakers Bureau Booklet, to be distributed widely to colleges, labs, high schools, teachers groups, etc.; (2) suggested titles for Centenary Symposia, with the names of possible speakers; (3) suggested "major speakers" for (a) talks on the "international significance of physics from an intellectual, cultural, industrial, economic, etc., perspective", (b) dinner speakers, (c) speakers at a special dinner on "the role of basic and applied physics in the development of communications", (d) plenary sessions on "Major contributions of physics of the 20th century".The Forum would like to be a major presence at the Centenary celebration and requests its members to make suggestion in the above (and other) categories. (Possible speakers are not to be contacted at this time.) Forum members input would be most efficiently made via Heinz.

Statement of the Council of the American Physical Society, 6 May 1996

"Energy: The Forgotten Problem"

Our nation's complacency about the energy problem is dangerous. While the understandable result of currently abundant supplies of energy at low prices, such complacency is short-sighted and risky. Low-cost oil resources outside the Persian Gulf region are rapidly being depleted, increasing the likelihood of sudden disruptions in supply. Energy-related urban air pollution has become a world-wide threat to human health. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide,other greenhouse gases and aerosols are climbing; this will cause changes in temperature, precipitation, sea level, and weather patterns that may damage both human and natural systems.

The introduction of non-fossil-fuel energy sources, new ways of producing and using fossil fuels, and a myriad of energy-efficient technologies have helped to improve our energy security and to reduce environmental stress. In an era of growing global energy demand, such innovations must continue.

The Council of the American Physical Society urges continued and diversified investments in energy research and development, as well as policies that promote efficiency and innovation throughout the energy system. Such investments and policies are essential to ensure an adequate range of options in the decades ahead. Our national security, our environmental well-being, and our standard of living are at stake.

Suggestions for Job Hunters in the Energy/Environmental Fields

Daniel M. Kammen, who is Assistant Professor of public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Co-Chair of their Science, Technology and Public policy Program, and a member of the Forum's Executive Committee, has written an interesting an informative article entitled A personal introduction to opportunities and resources for research and activism in energy and environmental science and policy. The article is available (and periodically updated) on the WWW at: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/faculty/kammen.html/energy- jobs

In the article, Kammen attempts (and, I think admirably succeeds) to answer the question: How do I go about getting involved in environmental work? His answer to this question contains wisdom (e.g., "...study what you enjoy over what [you] think will afford you some idealized credential..."), lots of practical tips (e.g., "Start talking to people."), and some juicy humor (e.g., "Regardless of whether you regard neoclassical economics as a crucial too, or as a means to obfuscate the truth, it has an important role in current thought..."). The article ends with a long listing of program and organization names, addresses, and phone numbers related to environmental science.

Kammen's article has much useful information for anybody trying to break into any field, not just environmental work.. For example, he recommends that "...a cover letter and resume are useful in advance of a phone call....The letter is useful both because it gives you the opening line of your phone conversation ('My name is Jill Johnson, I sent you a letter a couple of weeks ago') and [because] it will have already forced you to figure out your fit with the organization you are contacting." Clearly such advice is as good outside as inside the field of environmental science.

Last, but not least from the standpoint of this editor, Kammen's article is an example of fine writing. Kammen is to the point, his prose is crispy and spicy, and he gives the impression of being passionate about his subject. I recommend it to anybody looking for a job, particularly if their interest is in environmental work.

NSF's Science and Engineering Indicators

The NSF tracks resources, demographics, and trends of the nation's R&D efforts. Such information is periodically transmitted to the President of the United States via a document called Science & Engineering Indicators. According to the AIP's Bulletin of Science Policy News Number 125 ("FYI", by Audrey T. Leath), the lastest Indicators contains chapters on Elementary and Secondary Science and Mathematics Education, Higher Education in Science and Engineering, Science and Engineering Workforce, Research and Development, Academic Research and Development, Technology Development and Diffusion, Public Attitudes and Understanding, and Economic and Social Significance of Scientific and Engineering Research. "Science and EngineeringIndicators-1996" is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (stock number 038-000-00592-8).

Jeffrey Marque