January 2019 Newsletter

Cyber Vulnerabilities and Nuclear Weapons Risks

Lauren J. Borja and M. V. Ramana

School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia

In October 2018, the United States Government Accountability Organization (GAO) reported that “mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities” had been found in many weapon systems being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). These vulnerabilities allowed testers to “take control of systems and largely operate undetected” [1, p. 21], and could allow hackers to do the same.

The GAO report identified three underlying reasons for this problem. First, computers have proliferated in the designs of almost all weapon systems and enable many of their functions and communications. Second, the DOD has only recently prioritized cybersecurity in its weapon systems; in many cases, cybersecurity was not even a consideration when earlier weapon systems were designed. Finally, the DOD has a shallow understanding of how to construct secure weapon systems after ignoring them for many years. As a result, the GAO report said, the DOD has fielded a generation of insecure weapon systems, which could jeopardize military networks for years to come.

The report did not name specific weapon systems or describe faults in detail; however, its authors confirmed that their study included the systems that can cause the most destruction: nuclear weapons [2]. Concerns about the cybersecurity of nuclear weapons have also been raised by outside researchers [3]–[6], and the warning comes at a time when many states are planning large modernizations of their nuclear arsenals.

This article will discuss some of these risks. It will start with a description of the basic principles of cybersecurity, their application to the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and how these principles are being challenged by the modernization of nuclear forces. It then describes a key policy choice that increases the risk that a cyberattack on some elements of the nuclear arsenal could result in accidental or inadvertent nuclear weapons use, and ends with some recommendations for improving safety.

General Cybersecurity Principles
Academics studying computer science and the computer industry have identified many principles to create secure computer systems [7]. Ideally, these principles should be incorporated during the design of any digital network that supports critical infrastructure, such as those used to control the electrical grid, send financial information, or, more importantly, to command and control nuclear arsenals. Implementing these principles after the design stage, when the system is being tested or deployed, could lead to costly and incomplete fixes for faults and bugs.

The six basic principles of secure computing are availability, reliability, safety, integrity, maintainability, and confidentiality.

• Availability describes a system that readily offers the intended function. A system that lacks availability will experience intermittent outages in service, such as a cell phone service that is only available if the user is close to particular cell towers.
• Reliability is the ability of a system to offer the correct function. Systems that are not reliable will not perform the intended service some of the time, such as a cell phone that sometimes connects to a different number than the user dialed.
• Safety refers to a system whose operation, intended or otherwise, does not cause harm. Unintended actions can also be considered when assessing safety; a system that fails in a manner that does not cause harm is called fail-safe.
• Integrity describes a system that prohibits nonauthorized users from altering its functions or data. Electronic banking services are used because people trust that the numbers they can view online reflect the balances in their accounts. The integrity of this system would break down if these numbers could be changed by hackers or rogue bank employees.
• Confidentiality is a property of a system that does not disclose information to unauthorized parties. If online banking were to allow people other than the owners of the bank account and authorized bank employees to access the user account numbers and balances, it would no longer be confidential.

Maintainability refers to a system that can be repaired or updated. Systems that can only be updated during certain periods or under certain circumstances have poor maintainability.

While it is clear that all of these principles are desirable, achieving them simultaneously within a single system is challenging. The Mars Polar Lander, which crashed into the surface of Mars in December 1999, is an example of a system that was reliable but not safe [8]. The crash occurred because the landing software mistook turbulence from the Martian atmosphere as confirmation that Polar Lander had reached the planet’s surface. The software, performing according to its specifications, turned off the engines slowing the Polar Lander’s descent [9]. Prof. Nancy Leveson from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who specializes in building reliable and safe software systems, points out that, in some cases, safety and reliability can be in conflict: “making the system safer may decrease reliability and enhancing reliability may decrease safety” [8, p. 7].

Cybersecurity Principles and U.S. ICBMs
The United States operates a triad of delivery vehicles for its nuclear weapons. One component of this triad is the “land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs)” consisting “of 400 land-based ICBMs, each deployed with one warhead” [10, p. i]. These ICBMs are stored inside hardened missile silos, which are controlled by a network of launch control centers. Each center directly controls, on average, about ten missiles, and a secondary launch control center monitors the commands sent by the primary center [11]. Each ICBM contains a missile guidance computer, which is responsible for directing the nuclear-armed missile to its intended target [12]. The missile guidance computer can store multiple target locations according to what is called for by the U.S. nuclear war plan [13]. To launch a nuclear attack, the launch control centers specify both a target location and an execution order by either selecting one of the pre-stored options or manually entering different information [14].

It is not straightforward to apply the previously described principles to assess the cybersecurity of the U.S. ICBM force because publicly available information on these systems is greatly limited. One indirect approach is to examine measures of general security and there it is clear that the United States does seem to apply the principles of availability, reliability, safety, integrity, maintainability, and confidentiality to its ICBM force [15]. That being said, there are certain differences between physical- and cyber- security measures, and the incorporation of security measures in the physical realm should not be taken as confirmation of these principles in the cyber realm.

As described in the case of the Mars Polar Lander, there are conflicts between these different principles. A particular problem for nuclear weapons is the need for confidentiality, which can and does impact their safety or reliability. Because of the sheer complexity of the computer systems involved, the design of the hardware and software will have to be carried out by teams of engineers, often involving people who may not be allowed to handle confidential or secret data. Thus, specifications for how the system should operate must be communicated in a non-classified manner. But that is usually incomplete, and the inadequacy of information available to software and hardware professionals can lead to problems.

An illustration of the affect this problem can have was the replacement in 2007 of the internal guidance computers inside U.S. land-based nuclear missiles [16]. During testing, the new system gave inaccurate guidance [17]. These inaccuracies were eventually traced to errors in rounding and truncation in the software of the guidance computer [18]. The most likely reason for this underlying error is that design specifications were not properly outlined, as was the case with the Mars Polar Lander [19].

Modernization Brings New Challenges for Cybersecurity
When it comes the U.S. nuclear arsenal, one particular cybersecurity concern pertains to the system for nuclear command and control, a term given to the infrastructure, procedures, and policies used to direct and control nuclear forces. This system involves a vast network of computers that are interconnected and in constant communication with each other. As a result, there are many points of attack for potential hackers. Other aspects of the nuclear arsenal are also computerized and thus susceptible to cyberattacks. If left unaddressed, some of the weaknesses identified could lead to the accidental launch of nuclear weapons and even inadvertent nuclear war [3]–[6].

Worsening the cybersecurity problem, the United States [20] is modernizing its nuclear arsenal by developing new weapon systems and investing in improvements in their command and control networks. If modernizations of nuclear arsenals are to follow the precedent established by other military weapon systems, the use of computers and digital electronics in these systems will greatly expand, accentuating cyber risks to nuclear command and control.

Not only does modernization involve the introduction of computers into hitherto uncomputerized parts of the arsenal, it also brings in new challenges to older parts of the system that have already incorporated computers and digital systems. Many of the components inside the nuclear command and control system are decades old; one instance of such an old system that has been often discussed in public is the use of floppy discs to direct nuclear forces [21]. New components will therefore be drastically different from those currently in use. That might seem like an advance, but the change will bring safety and security challenges. For instance, using floppy discs, an outdated technology, is definitely inconvenient and compromises maintainability, but, because of their relatively small capacity for data storage, they are less susceptible to computer malware and thus enhances integrity.

A further complication is the ongoing globalization of the supply chain for commercially-available computer components. Today’s computer components are often designed, fabricated, and assembled in many different nations. Even if a country has set up in-house fabrication facilities, it is likely that these will use machinery produced in other countries. The usage of equipment from multiple countries increases the possibility that malicious design features or hardware components might be covertly embedded into devices. Once they have been built in, these covert features are almost impossible to detect [22].

As nuclear systems are modernized, the tendency is to use commercially-available products, because developing new components from scratch will require more testing and resources. An example of the use of commercially-available, also called off-the-shelf, products includes the set of instruments that communicate flight data during missile flight tests. A U.S. Air Force budget justification document said that the replacement effort for this component “will maximize the use of off-the-shelf components to meet mission requirements” [23, p. 7].

The cybersecurity of the nuclear arsenal is also challenged by the lifecycle of modern computer components, which require more frequent updates and replacement. For computer systems used in everyday life, these updates are an inconvenience, but most people realize that undertaking these routine updates lowers their chances of being infected by malware or viruses. Weapon systems are different and incorporating such updates in a timely fashion might be difficult because of various constraints. For example, U.S. nuclear missiles are expected to be in continuous use and, as a result, missile maintenance requires prior approval by higher authority [24]. Nuclear command and control systems are also likely to have similarly constrained maintenance schedules. As a result, known vulnerabilities will likely persist much longer in weapon systems than in other systems that can be updated more frequently. These known vulnerabilities will certainly continue to compromise security.

The WannaCry ransomware attack, which crippled the British National Health Services, illustrated the dangers of infrequent software updates. The attack used a vulnerability that affected systems that had not yet installed the most recent Microsoft patch [25]. Replacing parts in the U.S. land-based missile system often stretches over many years, from design to fielding. Because of this, there is a chance that components might have become obsolete by the time they are fielded.

Concerns Due to Policy Choices
U.S. nuclear weapons policy exacerbates the existing cyber security vulnerabilities as well as those caused by modernization. If the United States military were to get information from the many sensors it has deployed that there was an incoming nuclear attack, its stated policy allows the President to launch nuclear weapons against the country that is believed to be attacking. This launch could take place within a few minutes, before the arrival of the attacking missiles. The hope is that countries will be less likely to launch a preemptive strike, because, in theory, retaliation is always guaranteed and this would decrease the value of a hypothetical first strike.

Because its nuclear command and control system must comply with the short decision-making times necessary for such rapid launch, the system is configured for quick use. This way of deploying missiles increases the risk of accidental or inadvertent use. For example, storing nuclear warheads inside missiles that are fueled with combustible materials leads to the potential for accidental explosions [26]. In 1980, an accidental leak of liquid propellant from a U.S. ICBM led to an explosion that ejected parts of the missile, including the nuclear warhead, from its reinforced silo. Thankfully, the nuclear warhead did not detonate [27].

There are also other precursors to potential nuclear war, sometimes due to computers from an earlier era. On June 3, 1980 at 2:26 am, a computer screen in a command post of the U.S. Strategic Air Command began indicating incoming Soviet-launched ballistic missiles. Within a few seconds, more missiles appeared [28]. Bomber pilots were notified to start their engines and await orders on the tarmac. U.S. ICBMs were prepared for launch as well. Fortunately people realized that something was amiss—the number of incoming missiles fluctuated wildly with no clear pattern of attack. A threat assessment conference dismissed the signals as spurious, and the nuclear bombers and missiles were told that the alert had ended. An investigation revealed that a computer chip failure had led to the erroneous readings [29]. However, if the spuriousness of the warning had not been realized with the roughly 30 minutes it takes for a missile to fly from the Soviet Union to the United States, the U.S. President might have decided to launch missiles at the Soviet Union.

A Modern Nuclear Accident
As more digital components are built into the nuclear command and control network and the weapons themselves, the potential for cyber related problems will increase. New problems will also present themselves as more components become digital or older components are modernized. Computer components introduce more uncertainty into the already complex task of controlling and directing nuclear forces. When combined with the short timescales for decision making put into place by launch on warning policies, problems introduced by digital components could lead to unpredictable accidents with catastrophic consequences [30], [31]. Knowing that modern technology makes small errors more likely, it is important to take steps to ensure that these malfunctions do not led to catastrophe.

Without access to classified data, it is difficult to prescribe specific steps that can increase the overall safety of the system. However, one can argue in general that measures that enhance safety, even if it comes at the cost of availability, are desirable from the viewpoint of reducing the chances of accidental or inadvertent nuclear weapons use. One example is to store the nuclear warheads separately from the ballistic missiles that carry them. Such measures would lower the risk of inadvertent or accidental nuclear war.

Lowered risk, of course, doesn’t mean no risk. In the longer term, the only way to eliminate such a risk is to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.

Lauren.borja@ubc.ca

m.v.ramana@ubc.ca

References

1. GAO, “Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DoD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities,” United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., GAO-19-128, Oct. 2018.
2. “New U.S. Weapons Systems Are a Hackers’ Bonanza, Investigators Find - The New York Times.” [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/us/politics/hackers-pentagon-weapons-systems.html. [Accessed: 12-Oct-2018].
3. B. G. Blair, “Global Zero on Nuclear Risk Reduction: De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures,” Global Zero, Apr. 2015.
4. A. Futter, “Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons,” Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018, p. 208.
5. B. Unal and P. Lewis, “Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House, London, Research Paper, 2018.
6. P. O. Stoutland and S. Pitts-Kiefer, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Sep. 2018.
7. A. Avizienis, J.- Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr, “Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing,” IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure Comput., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 11–33, Jan. 2004.
8. N. Leveson, Engineering a Safer World. MIT Press, 2011.
9. “NASA Reveals Probable Cause of Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space-2 Mission Failures.” [Online]. Available: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=105. [Accessed: 25-Nov-2018].
10. CRS, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D. C., Nov. 2018.
11. B. Blair, Strategic Command and Control, 1st edition. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1985.
12. T. S. ICBM Prime team, “Minuteman Weapons System History and Description.” Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) System Program Office (SPO), Jul-2001.
13. B. G. Blair, “Mad Fiction,” Nonproliferation Rev., vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 239–250, Apr. 2014.
14. Minuteman Systems Engineering, “WS-133A-M Upgrade Wing III and V: Integrated Minuteman Command and Control Systems,” Boeing Aerospace Company, Seattle, WA, D2-19944–1, Feb. 1978.
15. L. J. Borja, “The Price of Modernization: Cyber Vulnerabilities in the Nuclear Arsenal,” in preparation.
16. “Team Malmstrom first to accomplish missile guidance system replacement,” Malmstrom Air Force Base. [Online]. Available: http://www.malmstrom.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/348943/team-malmstrom-first-to-accomplish-missile-guidance-system-replacement. [Accessed: 18-Nov-2018].
17. “MINUTEMAN III GUIDANCE AND PROPULSION REPLACEMENT PROGRAMS (GRP),” The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), Annual Report, Jan. 2001.
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21. “Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging Legacy Systems,” US Government Accountability Office, GAO-16-46, May 2016.
22. S. Bhasin and F. Regazzoni, “A survey on hardware trojan detection techniques,” in 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2015, pp. 2021–2024.
23. “ICBM - EMD FY2013,” Air Force, Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification 0604851F, Feb. 2012.
24. Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E),” Air Force, Test and Evaluation 99–102, Mar. 2011.
25. C. Graham, “NHS cyber attack: Everything you need to know about ‘biggest ransomware’ offensive in history,” The Telegraph, 13-May-2017.
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31. S. D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, 1st ed. Princeton University Press, 1995.

Meter-scale Neutrino Detectors Could Verify Shutdown of Reactors at Yongbyon
A key part of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Yongbyon hosts the 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor that produced plutonium for the North Korea’s weapons program, a newer Experimental Light Water Reactor, older reactor projects, fuel processing facilities, and a uranium enrichment facility [4, 5, 6]. Since the Singapore summit, North and South Korea [7] and the United States [8] have suggested the dismantlement of Yongbyon as a possible step in reducing tensions.

If leaders agree to eliminate one or more reactors at Yongbyon, the U.S. and others may seek assurance that the reactors remain shut down during the long cool-down period preceding dismantlement. Traditional monitoring tools include onsite inspections and satellite observation of the site. Neutrino detectors could complement these approaches, perhaps as an early step toward more comprehensive action at Yongbyon. Unlike full reactor inspections, installing neutrino detectors would not require access to the most sensitive parts of the site. Compared to satellite imaging, neutrino detectors offer more persistent and precise reactor observations and an opportunity for cooperative engagement on the ground.

The technology to perform neutrino-based reactor monitoring is well demonstrated. Physicists have observed reactor on-off transitions in neutrino detectors since the 1980s [9, 10]. As of 2018, many groups worldwide are observing reactor neutrinos in meter-scale systems [11-17]. These detectors are largely motivated by searches for new physics in the neutrino sector, but they also demonstrate practical features for reactor monitoring. Instead of using an underground site to control backgrounds, several detectors now use design features and analysis techniques to allow on-surface operation. Some groups have built detectors inside shipping containers or trailers, indicating feasibility for rapid field deployment. Reactor neutrino detectors now operate for months or years with little onsite maintenance, continuously sending data offsite for analysis.

At Yongbyon, we and our colleagues estimate that a meter-scale scintillator detector could provide timely notice of unauthorized reactor startups following a shutdown agreement [3]. A capable detector could fit inside a standard shipping container. As a basis for sensitivity estimates, we use the efficiency and backgrounds measured in the 4-ton PROSPECT detector, currently observing neutrinos from a reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory [11]. If placed 20 meters from the 5 MWe reactor core, a similar detector could identify a reactor startup at 95% confidence level within 2 days. At the larger Experimental Light Water Reactor, a detector could identify a startup within 2 hours and potentially monitor the fuel evolution (see [3] for more details). Neutrinos could be observed from a standoff distance longer than 20 meters, but the required detector size scales with the square of the distance. The PROSPECT detector was constructed in less than a year for about $5 million.

Neutrino Physics is an Opportunity to Engage North Korean Scientists and Engineers
Deploying neutrino detectors at Yongbyon would require coordination between technical teams from North Korea and other nations. However, it would not require exchange of classified or militarily sensitive information. Details on the design and use of reactor neutrino detectors are available in the open scientific literature. Neutrino detectors are therefore a low-stakes opportunity for scientists and engineers from North Korea and other nations to work together. As in former Soviet republics, such cooperative work could help to rebuild trust and redirect scientists and engineers from the weapons program to non-military applications.

Cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors at Yongbyon could open the door to wider scientific engagement in and beyond the region. The physics communities in South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, Europe, and the United States could support the effort from multiple angles. For example, scientists from North Korea could receive initial training in neutrino physics in China. Detectors at Yongbyon could be paired with detectors at power reactors in South Korea, furthering North-South unity. Major new neutrino experiments in East Asia, such as Hyper-Kamiokande in Japan [19] (and possibly South Korea [20]) and JUNO in China [21], are natural opportunities to strengthen peaceful regional ties. With time, other countries could consider student and scientist exchanges with North Korea in the area of particle physics.

Neutrino Detectors can be a small step, among wider efforts
Of course, neutrino physics can be only a small part of reducing nuclear risks on the Korean Peninsula. The enrichment and reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon are not amenable to neutrino-based monitoring. In North Korea, a full program of Cooperative Threat Reduction—the term Nunn and Lugar coined for multilateral efforts in the former Soviet Union—would include many other components. Still, it bears some reflection that neutrino physics as an experimental science began with former weapons scientists at a plutonium production reactor [22]. On another continent, the 1954 founding of CERN was one of the first diplomatic agreements between Germany, France, and their neighbors following World War II.

Seven months after the Singapore summit, Nunn and Lugar’s prediction of a “long and complicated process” for the nuclear talks seems correct. It may be much longer before joint objectives become clear, including the future of the reactors at Yongbyon. Nonetheless, policymakers could consider preparing neutrino-based tools, among others, in case further steps become possible. The final engineering work for a field-ready neutrino system could begin immediately. We encourage policymakers to consider this unconventional idea within the broader pursuit of a stable, secure Korean Peninsula.

Rachel Carr is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT. Patrick Huber is Professor of Physics and Director of the Center for Neutrino Physics at Virginia Tech.

References

1. S. Nunn and R. Lugar, “What to do if the talks with North Korea succeed,” Washington Post (2018).
2. A. A. Borovoi and L. A. Mikaelyan, “Possibilities of the practical use of neutrinos," Soviet Atomic Energy 44, 589 (1978).
3. R. Carr et al, “Neutrino-based tools for nuclear verification and diplomacy in North Korea,” arXiv:1811:04737 [physics.soc-ph].
4. D. Albright and K. O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (ISIS Press, 2000).
5. S. S. Hecker, “A return trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (2010).
6. K. K. R. Lai, W. J. Broad, and D. E. Sanger, “North Korea is starting up a reactor that could upset Trump's talks with Kim," New York Times (2018).
7. DPRK and ROK, “Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018” (2018).
8. U.S. Department of State, “On the Outcome of Summit Meeting between President Moon and Chairman Kim" (2018).
9. A. I. Afonin at al. “Neutrino experiment in the reactor of the Rovno atomic power plant: cross-section for inverse beta decay,” JETP Lett. 41, 435-438 (1985), [Pisma Zh. Eksp. Teor. Fiz.41, 355 (1985)].
10. N. S. Bowden et al., “Experimental results from an antineutrino detector for cooperative monitoring of nuclear reactors,” Nucl. Instrum. Meth. A572, 985-998 (2007), arXiv:physics/0612152 [physics].
11. J. Ashenfelter et al. (PROSPECT), “First search for short-baseline neutrino oscillations at HFIR with PROSPECT" (2018), arXiv:1806.02784 [hep-ex].
12. Y. J. Ko et al. (NEOS), “Sterile Neutrino Search at the NEOS Experiment,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 121802 (2017), arXiv:1610.05134 [hep-ex].
13. I. Alekseev et al. (DANSS), “Search for sterile neutrinos at the DANSS experiment,” (2018), arXiv:1804.04046 [hep-ex].
14. A.P. Serebrov et al. (Neutrino-4), “The first observation of effect of oscillation in Neutrino-4 experiment on search for sterile neutrino,” (2018), arXiv:1809.10561 [hep-ex].
15. H. Almazan et al. (STEREO), “Sterile Neutrino Constraints from the STEREO Experiment with 66 Days of Reactor-On Data,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 121, 161801 (2018), arXiv:1806.02096 [hep-ex].
16. N. van Remortel, “Commissioning and calibration of the SoLid experiment," (2018), XXVIII International Conference on Neutrino Physics and Astrophysics. DOI:10.5281/zenodo.1287001.
17. J. Carroll et al., “Monitoring Reactor Anti-Neutrinos Using a Plastic Scintillator Detector in a Mobile Laboratory" (2018), arXiv:1811.01006 [physics.ins-det].
18. A. Haghighat et al., “Observation of Reactor Antineutrinos with a Rapidly-Deployable Surface-Level Detector” (2018), arXiv:1812.02163.
19. K. Abe et al. (Hyper-Kamiokande Proto-Collaboration), “Hyper-Kamiokande Design Report” (2016), arXiv:1805.04163 [physics.ins-det].
20. K. Abe et al. (Hyper-Kamiokande), “Physics potentials with the second Hyper-Kamiokande detector in Korea," PTEP 2018, 063C01 (2018), arXiv:1611.06118 [hep-ex].
21. T. Adam et al., “JUNO Conceptual Design Report” (2015), arXiv:1508.07166 [physics.ins-det].
22. F. Reines, “The neutrino: From poltergeist to particle,” Nobel Lecture (1995).

Sovereign Molecules
In an ideal gas, molecules are entities that interact with each other only upon direct contact (“collision”) as they move among each other through physical space. The only forces between molecules occur at the peripheries of the molecules at the instant of collision: the individual molecule extends no force, exerts no influence, at any distance from itself. Furthermore, the collisions are elastic: they exert no influence upon the interiors of the molecules participating in the collision and are completed at the instant they commence. Excepting the instantaneous moment of impact, these ideal molecules do not “know” of each other’s presence; the interior of each of these molecules is never “aware” of the existence of the others. The result of these elastic collisions among many molecules, confined in a finite enclosed space, is molecular chaos—completely disordered motion of the individual molecules (no discernible pattern). In an unbounded space, the molecules rapidly distance themselves from each other. Appropriate averages over these random motions lead to the usual ideal gas laws (Boyle’s Law – at a constant temperature, the pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to its volume; Charles’ Law – at a constant pressure, the volume of a gas is directly proportional to its absolute temperature). These laws successfully describe the behavior of real gasses at sufficiently high temperatures—that is, when the average energy, per real molecule, is sufficiently great.

Real molecules exert long range forces upon each other—their influence extends far beyond their individual peripheries. This influence extends to the interior of the interacting molecules and is also extensive in time—the influence both over external motions and internal affairs extends over finite durations of time. When the temperature is high enough, the motions of these real molecules cannot be distinguished from those of ideal ones. The energies of their individual motions so far exceed the energies of their mutual and internal interactions that the latter cannot be noticed. They still display the random violent motions of ideal gas. However, as the mean molecular energies are lowered (that is, as the temperature is decreased), the extended mutual influences of the molecules allows the spontaneous occurrence of order. The energies of mutual attraction begin to countervail against the energies associated with the random flying apart of the molecules. They begin to “clump” together rather than strive to fly apart; the gas begins to liquify. At sufficiently low temperatures, structural patterns of molecular position and motion are formed—patterns commonly described as “crystals” – the gas has “frozen” into a solid. These intrinsic, ordered, patterns are not the result of any imposed templates or overall “planning and negotiation.” They just “happen” when the circumstances are right. The ordered motion of molecules in a crystal is “collaborative”—all move together: “all for one and one for all,” though it must be kept in mind that all relative motion does not cease in a real crystal at a finite temperature. The molecules still “jiggle” around their respective equilibrium positions.

Sovereignty of Nations
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “sovereignty” as a “supreme power, especially over a body politic”, or “freedom from external control.” The power of sovereign government over its people or territories is “unlimited in extent.” A sovereign nation can treat its people and its territories as it wishes. The government of the People’s Republic of China, or of Myanmar, can hence legitimately complain about infringement upon their sovereignty by a world that enunciates horror at those government’s massacre of their own citizens. A sovereign United States, “of an unqualified nature,” can shrug its shoulders with legal impunity as the acid rains generated in its territories destroy the lakes and forests of a sovereign Canada, “having undisputed ascendancy” over its land and waters. Sovereign nations, ideally, have absolute authority of their own territory and no authority at all over the territory of others. There is no overlap of sovereignty except by the deliberate projection of force onto the territories of others-which, of course, is an act of war. War does not respect sovereignty.

A collection of such ideal sovereign nations, on the finite surface of the Earth, is a group of non- influencing entities, immune in their interiors to the activities of others, interacting only briefly and violently at their peripheries. Such as system is chaotic—without order: “The international systems, whether it is dominated for a time by six Great Powers or only two, remains anarchical—that is, there is no greater authority than the sovereign, egoistical nation-state” (Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Decline of Great Powers. New York: Random House, page 440; emphasis added). The analogy between such a system and an ideal gas, as described in the previous section, seems very close, including the tendency of both systems to push out to fill the entire available space: the gas pushes to its container walls, exerting a pressure upon them; the nations push out over the non-nation territories of the globe, colonizing or incorporating them. Also, like ideal molecules, the definitions of the ideal sovereign nation give no hint as to the origin of its sovereign nature: sovereignty just “is.” Actually, of course, molecules are created by intermolecular collisions—chemical reactions; sovereignty also is created by interactions—wars—between states or “tribes”, between feudal lords and warriors, between peoples and states or lords.

Limits to Sovereignty
In the nuclear age, even small nations may challenge the viability of the interior capital cities of distant superpowers. (Israel may be able to threaten Teheran with nuclear devastation delivered by its own Jericho II ballistic missiles or by its US supplied F-16 aircraft; eventually it may be able to similarly strike Moscow. Similarly, Pakistan can threaten New Delhi and India can threaten Karachi. Even now, France or Great Britain possess the capability of destroying Moscow or Beijing with ballistic missiles launched from underground silos or submarines. Of course, the major nuclear powers, possessing large stocks of immensely powerful nuclear weapons with the means to project them anywhere in the world regardless of natural or man-made defensive barriers, have the capacities to destroy each other., all the rest of the nations, and perhaps all of humankind as we know it via radioactive fallout and/or “nuclear winter”. A nation that cannot even guarantee the survival of its own citizens, much less its own survivability as an entity, cannot be said to be free “from external control.” Even without nuclear weapons, nations can inflict grievous harm upon each other via the long-range delivery of potent chemical and biological weapons as well as with the precision placement of “conventional” explosives (e.g., Seoul remains at the “mercy” of North Korea’s massive conventional artillery stocks). And how can we say that its power over its territories is” unlimited” when the nation, big or small, may not even be able to protect its peacetime commercial air—land—and waterways from death and disruption at the hands of “terrorists” representing other nations, or not nations at all? The 2016 U.S. national elections have shown how difficult it is to guarantee the validity of its own political processes from the interference of other nations. (Supposedly, there were also recent attempted international interferences in French and German national elections.)

Given the destructiveness that even a very small, “weak” nation can inflict upon its neighbors, nations who themselves are firm believers in national sovereignty do not willingly extend that concept to neighbors. And these neighbors, and the rest of the world, may accept these restraints—giving up the “good” of sovereignty for the “good” of peaceful quasi-sovereignty. If the Palestinians ever hope to achieve statehood without destroying Israel, it will only be by the acceptance of severe restrictions as to what military power they may create and maintain upon their national territory, surely a great limitation on the usual “undisputed ascendance” over its lands and peoples. (And Israel will have to give up some of its absolute authority over the surface and sub-surface waters of the region and its sea coast.)

But “acts of war,” whether in “peace” or wartime, nuclear or otherwise, are not the only infringement upon conventional “sovereignty.” Can a nation be free “from external control” when a good part of its land, resources, communication facilities (such as “Facebook”), and productive capacities, belong to other nations, when many of the tools necessary for defense and economic well-being in a modern, technological age, must be acquired from other distant nations, when many of its people can only be productively employed and gain a livelihood under the direction and control of citizens of “foreign” nations?

Economics and long-range projection of weapons are not the only constraints upon traditional sovereignty. In a finite world, the resources—for example, oil from internal or external sources—used by one nation in advancing its comfort and well-being, are used up and no longer available to other people’s when they become capable and wish to exploit the same portion of the earth’s goods. Fish caught in the Pacific by Japan are no longer available in Peru; in fact, with the prevalent over-fishing, they may not be available to anybody! Nations can, and do, poison the air, waters, and lands of their neighbors either intentionally, or inadvertently via usual economic activities.

Furthermore, the harm may not come from a neighboring nation—the source may be “generic”! The fluorocarbons leaking from an automobile air conditioner in an American city contributes to the “hole in the ozone layer” over an Australian citizen. The burning of rain forests in Brazil contributes to the global “greenhouse effect”, warming the atmosphere, melting the polar icecaps, thus contributing to droughts in the farmlands of the American Midwest and floods in the impoverished sea plain of Bangladesh. The generation of peaceful Ukrainian nuclear-electric power in the then Soviet Union has led to the destruction of the livelihoods of peaceful Lapp reindeer herders in northern Sweden.

Hence even without war (the customary creator and destroyer of the nation-state and the usual accomplice of the system of sovereign states) or warlike acts, sovereignty—as customarily defined—is a fiction of the modern age. Nations do have profound influences upon each other even in peacetime, upon the peoples as well as the governments of the rest of the world. The completely anarchic system of states, which is the corollary of the existence of the individual sovereign state, is also fictional. Many actions, having significant impact upon domestic life, are done “in concert” by the various nations—even competing ones. (Even in the midst of deadly combat, Iraq and Iran met to discuss oil production quotas and prices.) There is already considerable “order” and restraint—some things are “just not done” even though the “power” to do them exists. And the ordering is becoming stronger.

Order of Nations
It is usually assumed that the alternate system to the present anarchic system of completely sovereign states is one of order through world government. Such a single government could come about with the planned conquest of all other states by one of the super-powers. However, given the fact that even one of the smaller nations, acting in its own defense, could destroy a superpower, admittedly committing suicide in the process, it seems unlikely that a viable world order will result from military conquest.

An alternative to military ordering is economic domination of the many by the one. But the modern “high tech” world is very unstable. Today’s small nations become tomorrow’s economic superpowers while the economic giants of today fritter away their tomorrows via the uncontrolled accumulation of debt, the disintegration of their societies’ physical, cultural, and educational infrastructure, and the growth of domestic disorder. Hence a planned economic ordering also seems unlikely.

Many assume that a formal ordering of the world will come about as a result of diplomatic negotiations among governments if not by conquest or economic domination. After reaching agreement on the templates for world order via long, tedious, and agonizing negotiations, nations would presumably diminish their individual sovereignties in a carefully orchestrated, step-by-step, non-spontaneous process. But there is no evidence that such a process is under way, and no reason to believe that any foreseeable government would acquiesce to such a process or such a resulting constraint upon their dignities and perquisites. It seems very unlikely that the nations of the UN are going to get together, like the states of their post-revolutionary American Confederation, in a deliberately planned surrender of sovereignty to a greater sovereign whole. In fact, at present, there is much evidence that some nations are striving to go in the opposite direction.

And yet order grows—apparently spontaneously. Citizens’ groups create ties among themselves that function even when their respective governments are not in communication. There are groups that share common cultural and environmental interests across national borders: international art associations, chess groups, scientific collaborations, music societies, whale watching associations, and so on. These groups engage in no governmental activities, but in meeting to share their activities they also share and intertwine their national commitments to some extent. Other citizen groups may engage in governmental activities but meet internationally on a nongovernmental basis: international associations of police, firemen, game wardens, bankers and financiers, manufacturers, natural resource producers, and so on. In the process of non-officially aligning their professional activities and outlooks, they create ties among their nations in spite of the wishes of their respective governments. Then there are the activities of international commerce and industry that transcend national boundaries in manifold manners, many of which are unknown to their formal governing bodies but create strong constraints on the sovereign nature of these governments. Finally, there are the quasi-governmental interactions in which citizen groups meet and negotiate in parallel to, sometimes instead of—official governmental delegations: United Nations support groups for example. And, of course, there are the citizen groups of one nation set up explicitly to influence the citizens and governments of another nation: differing groups of Guatemalans in the United States to manipulate American policy towards that unhappy nation, Polish American organizations lobby for greater American participation in Poland’s economic recovery, and so on. There is no overarching plan to all of these diverse processes, no formally preconceived model of the end of the process, no explicit template to which the international structure is being shaped.

And yet, apparently spontaneously, the nations are being shaped to each other, the rough edges which might dangerously abrade each other are, “peacefully”, themselves being abraded away. The ability and inclination of the sovereign nation to be sovereign—to behave free of external constraints, as if there were no other nations present—seems to be lessening (in spite of the expressed desires of some present governments pushing in the opposite direction), driven by the greater inclination to survive and prosper. We have not planned the final order of states; we may not be able to anticipate or control the ordering, but an ordered system seems to be replacing the chaos of classical sovereignty. The resultant order will probably not imply the disappearance of conflict—violent or otherwise—between and within states. There may still be considerable “jiggling” about their final equilibrium states, but the jiggling energy will not be enough to destroy the ordered states—if we survive to reach such an order.

Hence, pushing the analogy between molecules and nations beyond ideal gasses to real gasses, spontaneously (without a prior universal agreement upon, and establishment of, an overarching, omnipresent, all-powerful world government), we may see the evolution of order from disorder, and the development of a non-violent world commonwealth from the anarchical threats of nuclear violence. In spite of the apparent occasional pushes to international disorder, multilateralism may still triumph in the end.

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