Promoting Energy Efficiency in the Utility Sector through Coordinated Regulations and Incentives
David Goldstein
Energy policy initiatives, primarily at the state level, have achieved significant successes over the past fifteen years. These successes lead us to a better knowledge of what the potential impact of new and existing technologies for energy efficiency and renewable energy can be, and how effective policies have been in securing energy goals.
I will begin by reviewing the potentials for energy efficiency in the utility sector, focusing on end-use efficiency measures. Then I will discuss how changes in the incentive structure faced by utilities and by their customers are already allowing great strides to be made towards achieving these efficiency potentials. Finally, I will discuss the implications of these policies and programs for research and new product development.
Potentials for End-use Efficiency
Up until the mid-1970s, conventional wisdom held that energy demand must grow in proportion to economic production (gross domestic product or GDP). It also held that electricity demand grows faster than GDP, typically at 7% per year for the United States. Contemporaneous studies pointed out that such coupling was not necessary, that policies designed to increase efficiency, along with higher energy prices, would lead to a decoupling of energy (and electricity) with GDP.
This decoupling began to occur nationally for total energy after 1973. As shown in Figure I, energy per unit economic production declined about 25% over the following fifteen years. Even greater success was achieved in states that tried to develop affirmative energy policies. The figure also shows that in California, which adopted strong policies to reduce utility sector energy use, overall energy intensity went down faster than the rest of the United States, despite already starting at a lower level.
Figure II illustrates electricity intensity in California compared to the rest of the United States: through its energy policies, California was able to decouple electricity use from economic production as well.
Last year, several of the nation's leading environmental organizations completed a study of what could result from a comprehensive national energy policy based on lowest societal costs (1). The results are displayed in Figures III and IV. In the most aggressive "climate stabilization" scenario, electricity use declines by 14% in absolute terms while the economy grows by a factor of 2.4. Natural-gas consumption by end users (not including electric utilities) drops by 36%.
Politics to Achieve Energy Efficiency
Over the past twenty years, energy efficiency standards for new buildings and products have accounted for the bulk of energy savings. For example, the California Energy Commission projected some 14,000 megawatts of peak power savings from building and appliance efficiency standards over a 20 year period (2), compared to a total state peak load of approximately 45,000 megawatts.
Utilities can promote energy efficiency by providing rebates or other financial or informational incentives to their customers to encourage the selection of more energy-efficient products and designs. These incentive programs work synergistically with standards.
Energy-efficiency standards assist utility incentive programs by providing a base beyond which utilities are justified in paying for savings. Standards also provide test procedures by which products or designs can be rated, so that savings from the utility program can be more easily quantified and qualifying products identified.
Utility programs complement standards by effectively testing the feasibility of higher standard levels. If a utility achieves high market penetration of a given level of efficiency across a broad range of product designs or manufacturers, this achievement provides evidence that a standard would be economically justified. Standards can then achieve the same effectiveness with higher market penetration and without the necessity of utility customers as a whole paying for the efficiency improvements.
Traditional regulatory practices fail to let utilities see the long-term costs of capital-intensive power supply projects when they are comparing the economics of efficiency versus new supply. Under these policies, kWh sales can be profitable to the utility even when they are not in society's long-run best interest.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 encourages states to reform their regulation of utilities to correct misplaced incentives. This can be done by three simple mechanisms, all of which are used in some states: 1. Sales can be decoupled from profits. Under decoupling, a utility receives revenues based on projected sales, rather than actual sales. If it over-collects revenue due to higher sales than projected, this revenue, with interest, is returned to its customers in the form of lower rates the next year. The reverse situation applies for sales under the forecast. Revenues are thus constant. Since fuel costs are passed through directly to customers as an addition to ordinary revenue requirements, utility profits are also decoupled from sales. 2. Ability to pass through costs of energy efficiency programs. 3. Savings can be shared. Utilities in several states have been offered profit incentives in which some fraction of societal net benefit from energy efficiency programs--typically on the he order of 10%--is provided to shareholders. A utility makes money to the extent that it can install a larger number of more cost-effective energy efficiency measures.
When these three reforms are implemented, the results can be dramatic. Figure V shows the increase in energy savings from utility programs in California following a collaborative process in which these reforms were implemented. The growth of annual energy savings acquisitions is expected to continue, since many promising technologies and end-use areas have not yet been addressed by the utilities.
Transforming Markets
Early utility energy efficiency programs took the viewpoint of an average consumer who would go into a store and choose among the products in stock. Utilities would survey what products were available in their areas through retailers or distributors and offer incentives for the better products. The result of this approach was small energy savings, because the range of available efficiencies typically is small, and because of a significant "free rider" problem: Many of the customers who accept utility incentives to buy the more efficient product might have bought it anyway.(3)
Later generation approaches to utility incentive programs recognize that the utility industry can be a large player in the consumer products market. They look upstream to the needs of the manufacturer and distributor, and at the availability of technologies that may or may not currently be in production. They feature bold efficiency targets, announced sufficiently in advance for manufacturers to respond.
This approach has had significant impacts in transforming the market. Its success is illustrated by residential refrigerators. After the efficiency improvements provoked by the 1987 California standards, the range of efficiencies offered on the market was low. 1988 data suggested that a program seeking 10% energy savings beyond the slightly more stringent 1990 federal standards would be difficult to implement, because (depending on size and features) only 10% of the models on the market met a 10% savings threshold. Only a handful of units--less than 1%--were 15% lower in energy use than the standards. While some utilities were deterred from running programs by these data, one utility did offer rebates, producing the results illustrated in Figure VI (4). For 1990, the California utilities, which represents over 10% of the national market for refrigerators, agreed to base their programs on uniform efficiency targets at 10% and 15% savings. The results were unexpectedly good: nearly half of the rebates were issued for the 15% models.
As a result of this success, the 1991 program added a 20% improvement category. As seen in Figure VI, this category was the most popular one for 1991, despite the fact that such products did not exist at all eighteen months earlier. The 1992 California program dropped incentives entirely for the 10 and 15% savings levels and added higher tiers at 25%, 30%, and for some utilities, 35% and 40%. Manufacturers responded to these higher levels by producing a large number of 30%-savings models, and a significant number of 35%-savings.
This new strategy is being pursued through a continent-wide collaboration of utilities, public interest organizations, and state and federal government called the Consortium for Energy Efficiency (CEE). CEE is designing model programs, analogous to the refrigerator program, that can be adopted voluntarily by utilities throughout North America. These programs will be based on levels of efficiency that could be manufactured and sold in a cost-effective manner if the market demand for new efficiency technologies is sufficiently high.
CEE will also explore additional methods of acquisition of efficiency measures not currently available on the market. An example of this approach is the "Gold Carrot"(TM) program for refrigerators, in which utilities offered a Request For Proposal for refrigerators with efficiencies far beyond anything available in the market. The contract will be awarded on the basis of maximizing the economic value of energy savings. By raising $30 million to purchase more than a quarter million refrigerators for their customers, participating utilities will be able to cause the creation and marketing of products that use some 50% less energy than the 1990 standards.
Currently, energy efficiency does not sell. Most consumers will not pay extra for a device that saves energy unless the additional costs pay back in two years or less, even if the device will use energy for 20 or 50 years. In many cases, customers won't even purchase devices with payback periods shorter than two years. Thus, a physicists or engineer who invents a new device or process that can save energy will not be funded by his or her company to undertake the research necessary for product development. The scientist's boss will conclude that even if the inventor is correct and meets costs and performance goals, the product will not sell.
With utility programs designed to transform markets, this will no longer be the case. Product designers will find that whenever a device makes sense economically for society as a whole, it will become marketable through utility programs. This change should have major implications for the directions of product development, providing new opportunities for physicists, chemists, and engineers to apply their creativity towards improving energy efficiency.
Such a dynamic will also increase the potential savings from energy efficiency measures. Studies such as "America's Energy Choices" are based on analysis of policies that will implement efficiency measures whose cost and performance can already be characterized and quantified. Additional improvements that would be cost-effective but are not accessible in the open literature can never be included in such studies. Thus, the true potential for energy savings may greatly exceed that of even the most optimistic rigorous study.
Conclusion
There is a vast potential for energy efficiency improvements in the utility sector. Realistic levels of implementation of known technologies can yield absolute reductions in utility energy use. Mechanisms to achieve this potential are evolving and working in a number of states and with a number of utilities. When these policy mechanisms become widely accepted, they will unleash substantial new work in research, development, and commercialization of new products and new design processes to meet societal needs for cost-effective energy savings.
- A. Meyer et al., America's Energy Choices, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
- California Energy Commission, Energy Efficiency Report, October 1990, P400-90-003.
- Under the existing utility regulatory schemes, such results, featuring small energy savings but potentially moderately large customer participation, could be more profitable to the utility than the more effective energy efficiency programs described below.<.li>
- The results for 1989 are slightly less in energy savings than illustrated on the graph, because the 10% and 15% categories for that year referred tot he 1987 California standards rather than the 1990 federal standards. The difference between the standards is roughly 2.5-5%.
The author is with the Natural Resources Defense Council, San Francisco